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Infantry

July-August 1994



"My God! There we wuz an' here they wuz."

Defending the Anzio Beachhead, February 1944 ... Page 22

FLARE

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TOGO D. WEST, JR.
Secretary of the Army

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Commandant, The Infantry School

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Commandant's NOTE

MAJOR GENERAL JERRY A. WHITE Chief of Infantry

Tomorrow's Infantry—A Progress Report

In my Commandant's Note of July-August 1993, I discussed our Infantry Functional Area Assessment and its implications for total force integration, modernization, training, and the role of the Army as we approach the next century. In this issue, I want to bring you up to date on what has been accomplished during the past year, and highlight some of the challenges that still face us.

The entire spectrum of operations other than war (OOTW) will demand more and more of our attention in the years to come. The future role of our Infantry in contingency operations has come into sharper focus with the rapidly changing frequency and type of activity in Somalia, the deployment of peacekeeping forces to Macedonia, the emergence of ancient rivalries in parts of Africa, and even the spectre of political instability in our hemisphere. Today, more than ever before, Infantry units will be the first maneuver forces deployed, and we must ensure that they have the training, equipment, and logistical support to get in, do the job, and return safely. The requirements for rapid deployment, mission accomplishment, force protection, and redeployment comprise a complex equation, but one that is capable of being solved.

The most important element of this equation is the soldier. The Land Warrior fighting system described on Page 12 of this issue of INFANTRY is a vision of the dismounted soldier of the future that will incorporate enhanced integrated subsystems of lethality, command and control, survivability, mobility, and sustainment. Land Warrior represents the culmination of the extensive research and development that went into the earlier Soldier's Integrated Protective Ensemble (SIPE), and will enable commanders to influence battlefield tempo and maneuver forces more responsively and effectively than ever before.

A Land-Warrior equipped soldier can detect, identify, and determine the location of a target and engage it, either with his own weapons or with systems whose fires he can direct. His effectiveness will be greatly improved by voice, digital, and graphic communications systems at his disposal. His survivability will likewise be enhanced by ballistic and NBC protection, as well as protection against directed energy, flame, and incendiary weapons. The system will reduce the soldier's load and facilitate sustained operations for longer periods of time than present systems. The Land Warrior system is intended as a one-for-one replacement for the sub-systems now in use by the dismounted infantryman.

Another of the challenges that face us is small arms—the tools of the soldier's trade—and the Small Arms Master Plan (SAMP) will ensure that tomorrow's soldier carries the best possible type, mix, and munitions of small arms onto the future battlefield. A number of initiatives are now under way to make this possible. One of them, the modular weapon system for the M16 rifle and the M4 carbine, will have four mounting rails—one above the receiver, one below the barrel, and one on either side of the barrel—to permit the installation and simultaneous availability of a variety of accessories. Some of the accessories currently envisioned include powered optics, collimator sights, night vision devices, laser aiming lights, grenade launchers, flashlights, and the multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) small arms transmitter (SAT) training device. Once the system is fielded, commanders will be able to configure a unit's weapons to meet specific mission requirements, and an additional advantage of this system is that a soldier can mount and remount the available accessories without having to rezero it.

In another enhancement, the M4 carbine will be

replacing M16 rifles in selected units beginning in the second quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 1995. The production contract was awarded to Rock Island Arsenal in the third quarter of FY 1993, and the 82d Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, 101st Air Assault Division, and 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) will be the first units to receive the new carbines.

The M4 shares approximately 80 percent of its parts with the M16A2 rifle, and there is no operationally significant difference in accuracy or reliability between the two weapons. A close-combat optic will likewise complement the M4 and M16 family of weapons. Recognizing that the use of an aim point type optic with long eye relief will improve both the infantryman's ease of aiming and his situational awareness, the Army Research and Development Command is currently testing four candidate systems to develop and field a red- or blue-dot optic.

Central to the Small Arms Master Plan is the objective individual combat weapon (OICW), the centerpiece of the small arms family. The OICW—intended to replace the M16 rifle, the M4 carbine, the M249 (in its automatic rifle role), and the M203 grenade launcher—will be capable of firing both air bursting high explosive and compact lightweight kinetic energy munitions. Its range-determining laser and day-night sight will give the soldier a high probability of incapacitating point targets out to 500 meters and suppressing area targets out to 1,000 meters.

As envisioned, the OICW will weigh less than a fully loaded M203 system with AN/PVS-4 night sight. The OICW will become the future individual combat weapon for the infantry soldier, and the Infantry School fully supports the research, development, and the field-

ing of the objective individual combat weapon.

These are but a few of the areas in which progress has been made since I last discussed the functional area assessment and its impact on our Army. Other improvements include the 120mm battalion mortar system and its ammunition and fuzes, the improved mortar ballistic computer, a mortar fire control system tied in with the global positioning system, an objective crew-served weapon, a machinegun optic, and the mini eyesafe laser infrared observation set (MELIOS) described in this month's INFANTRY News section.

It is important to remember that we are making these improvements in the face of fiscal constraints not seen in recent memory. Confronted with the realities of a smaller Army, fewer training dollars, reduced resources to support the development of weapons systems, and increasing restrictions on the type and scope of training we can conduct, we need to account for our resources as never before. It is the responsibility of every leader to demand the strictest accountability and ensure that every dollar spent results in tangible benefits to our Army and its soldiers.

These technological advances—and the doctrinal base that will complement them—all attest to the ongoing effort to ensure that the American soldier is the best equipped, best trained, and best supported fighter in the world. The knowledge of this fact alone will deter many potential aggressors. There may remain others who will test our resolve, but the American soldier—backed by the tremendous technological and industrial potential of our Nation—will once again demonstrate his ability to seize the initiative, strike the decisive blow, and dominate the battlefield.



INFANTRY LETTERS



CLARIFICATION OF 60mm MORTAR PRODUCTIVITY

I appreciated Sergeant Robert S. Underwood's thoughtful critique (*INFANTRY*, March-April 1994, pages 3-4) of my proposal to splice two 60mm mortar cannons on one baseplate (*INFANTRY*, January-February 1994, page 3).

One point needs clarification. I did not intend to suggest that the size of the 60mm mortar section should be reduced. On the contrary, having previously identified an unresourced need for four additional soldiers (two for ammunition resupply, two for fire direction), my intent was to reallocate the two spaces saved to dedicated ammunition resupply or fire direction capabilities, leaving overall section strength at six. At this level, the 60mm mortar section is still understaffed.

RICHARD K. FICKETT
Herndon, Virginia

CREDIBLE FORCE AND DETERRENCE

I would like to comment on the subject of the emerging need for smart mortar munitions.

The capabilities of a force, enemy or friendly, affect the way it perceives another or the way it acts in the face of possible confrontation with that force. There's nothing new here. It is basic tactics—METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). The overt fielded capability can act as a deterrent to combatants judging how to behave when coming into contact with a peacekeeping force. In the case of United Nations (UN) elements deployed in a theater of conflict, it is a matter of tactical usage, rules of engagement, and in-

theater strategic reaction to the circumstances of the combatants.

U.S. Army light and medium infantry forces seem to lack the organic capability to deliver accurate, pinpoint counterfire at extended range with minimal collateral damage to non-combatants and property in the vicinity. Judging from the Mortar Program Plan of 1992, after-action reports from Operation DESERT STORM, and continued discussion by readers of and contributors to *INFANTRY*, there seems to be need for an infantry precision delivery weapon or munition.

Artillery accomplishes the precision fire task by using the laser designated 155mm M712 Copperhead projectile. But this size or type of tube artillery weapon is not usually available to UN peacekeepers, and it has not been deployed in Bosnia. Further, the UN rules of engagement often dictate the type of soldiers (foot, motorized, mechanized) to be used and how they are to act under fire. Infantry elements routinely have an organic infantry, hip-pocket "artillery" on such UN deployments. Having a precision guided mortar munition seems to be a solution worthy of further investigation.

Previous *INFANTRY* letters have addressed mortars and smart munitions (Mr. Earl Rubright's letter, September-October 1992, page 5; Mr. Richard K. Fickett's, January-February 1993, page 3; and my letter, May-June 1993, page 3). In my earlier letter, I cautioned against a precipitous or premature judgment on the adoption of a smart mortar projectile when other antitank solutions are at hand. This position is based primarily on cost factors in light of the decline in defense budgets. An ongoing Army study advisory group is addressing future improvements to the mortars and their family of munitions. Also, the Army is wrapping up its evaluation of

smart mortar technology based on a foreign comparative test of smart projectiles from Sweden and the United Kingdom.

According to the commentaries on the war in Bosnia, there is an apparent force credibility issue for the UN peacekeepers. The UN reaction to Serb attacks (mostly indirect fire) focuses on selecting the appropriate level of force in defensive actions. According to the reports, no suitable alternative weapon, short of a NATO tactical air strike, would extend the range of the UN's direct-fire weapons to counter the Serb artillery. If these peacekeepers were equipped with a precision mortar munition of sufficient size and range, there might be less risk to the UN self-defense ground elements from the indirect fire assaults of the Serbs. I recognize that this one solution greatly oversimplifies the situation, and that there are other viable responses or combinations of responses. This peacekeeping lesson has a direct bearing on the United States' rapid force projection initiative and on shaping and equipping future light forces.

What roles or tasks should this smart, or precision, munition be capable of performing? Obviously, in a world-wide sense, ranging from low to high intensity, the sky's the limit. Realistically, in the area of peacekeeping, certain tasks are exemplified in the Bosnian conflict. A few that come immediately to mind are counter-sniper fire, counter-mortar, defeat of a bunker or strongpoint (machinegun), specific attack on a medium vehicle target, and so on. With these targets, the developer can focus on what the munition needs to do and which seekers/sensors and warheads are appropriate to defeat them.

At first approximation, there is a need to fill two general needs—rapid counterfire and precise target kill. The first

implies an area target such as in counter-mortar fire, and the second requires a soldier to guide the round. This soldier can be either a forward observer (FO) or a designator to mark the target. The FO/designator is deemed critical in providing positive identification friend or foe (IFF) and controlling the fire, thus minimizing collateral damage or friendly fire incidents. A dual-mode seeker is therefore required. In short, we need a precision mortar to do the job; we need it to be organic to our infantry contingency force; and we need it now!

The fastest way to get such a capability is through a non-developmental item (NDI) acquisition, as in the Army's approach to the armored gun system. It is uncertain, however, whether available smart mortar munitions can presently meet all of the Army criteria, especially interoperability. Instead of a totally new development, there could be an NDI+ to get a smart projectile sooner. Results of the foreign comparative test program undoubtedly will help refine a munition system definition. The Army could choose to meet its needs in parallel, as was done with the baseline 120mm mortar program—for example, buying a limited quantity of "off-the-shelf" hardware for use now and planning to modify NDI smart mortar ammunition for long-term optimization.

ROBERT F. GAUDET
Fairfax Station, Virginia

DUAL-MOUNTING 60mm MORTARS

I would like to contribute to the discussion between Mr. Richard K. Fickett (INFANTRY, January–February 1994, page 3) and Sergeant First Class Robert S. Underwood (March–April 1994, pages 3–4) on the challenges facing the 60mm mortar section and on the current suggested solutions.

I completely disagree with Mr. Fickett's suggestion of mounting two 60mm mortars side by side; this is not feasible for the following reasons:

- Section survivability would decrease.

- The section could not operate split-section (independent of each other).
- A misfire would render both tubes inoperable until it was corrected.
- Coordinated illumination missions would be impossible.
- The section could not fire traversing missions.
- Firing both guns from a single baseplate could be too powerful for it (assuming both guns fired simultaneously).
- Dual-mounting would cause uneven settling of the baseplate, unless both tubes fired at the same time during adjustment.

Sergeant Underwood and Mr. Fickett are correct in resurfacing a long-standing light infantry problem. My position is that the M224 60mm mortar is an excellent system and that the solution is not to modify the mortar but to increase the number of soldiers on a crew.

On the basis of my 11 years as an airborne infantry mortarman (four years with 60mm mortars and seven with 81mm mortars), I believe that only the best-trained 60mm mortar crews can perform their required minimum ARTEP missions. In most cases, the problem is not a lack of training but a six-man crew that has too many tasks to perform at the same time. For example, the 60mm mortar section sergeant is required to perform the duties of both a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant, act as squad leader, fire direction center (FDC) chief, and radio telephone operator for the section, and operate an FDC

computer. It is obvious that in a challenging combat environment of continuous operations, or training replicating that environment, no single NCO can be expected to perform all of those tasks to ARTEP 7-92 Mission Training Plan (MTP) standards.

In addition, live-fire training both in peacetime and in combat presents a serious safety concern. Most installations require one sergeant per gun to act as safety officer; two sergeants are required to operate two like items of FDC equipment and compare data to ensure that the correct data is sent to the guns. Under the current TOE, all the requirements are normally met, but safety is somewhat compromised with long-term operations. It is easy to see the probability of error when a sergeant is simultaneously supervising a gun, communicating with the forward observer (FO), operating the ballistic computer or plotting board, communicating with the squad leader by phone, and ensuring that the entire gun-line receives correct and safe fire commands.

Another significant challenge to a light company commander's employment of his 60mm mortar squad is getting ammunition to the mortars. The combination of over-tasked NCOs and poor internal logistical support has led to the less-than-ideal employment of the section and sometimes to outright abuse of the section's enormous capabilities.

The obvious solution is to increase the size of the mortar section at company level, and I propose increasing it

OLD TOE

ONE GUN
SSG, Section Sergeant/Computer
SP4, Gunner
PFC, Assistant Gunner

TWO GUN
SGT, Squad Leader/Computer
SP4, Gunner
PFC, Assistant Gunner

PROPOSED TOE

SECTION HEADQUARTERS
SSG, Section Sergeant/Computer
SGT, Computer/RTO

ONE GUN
SGT, Squad Leader
SP4, Gunner
PFC, Assistant Gunner
PV2, Ammunition Bearer

TWO GUN
SGT, Squad Leader
SP4, Gunner
PFC, Assistant Gunner
PV2, Ammunition Bearer

from six men to ten. Two of the four additional soldiers would be privates and two would be sergeants. The privates would be ammunition bearers, one sergeant would act as squad leader, and one would be an FDC computer and radio telephone operator (RTO). The accompanying tables show the comparison between the old and new TOEs.

This TOE change would increase the requirements for MOS 11C soldiers throughout the Army, adding about 578 soldiers Army-wide. This is certainly a significant stress on an already over-burdened personnel system, but when the time came to employ the mortar in support of light infantry engaged with the enemy, I think our leaders would find the change well worth the personnel investment.

THOMAS R. WOODHAMS
SFC, U.S. Army
Battalion Mortar
Platoon Sergeant
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

WHY NOT LEGITIMIZE OOTW TRAINING?

In introducing the chapter on operations other than war (OOTW), Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 1993, states, "The Army's primary focus is to fight and win the nation's wars. However, Army forces and soldiers operate around the world in environments that may not involve combat" (page 13-0). The implication here is obvious: The nation does not have to be at war to have soldiers in combat. Therefore, the Army is entirely justified in awarding combat patches and Combat Infantryman Badges (CIBs) for such OOTW operations as those in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, northern Iraq, and Somalia. This is a good first step, but what it must also do is train its soldiers specifically for OOTW.

Proficiency in this area is supposed to be gleaned through the tenet of versatility, which requires not only that units not focus on OOTW but that they be able to transition to such operations

"without loss of focus" (page 2-9). Without loss of focus from what? If I'm receiving sniper fire or even just having rocks thrown at me in Mogadishu, I sure don't want to be preserving focus for anything other than the problem at hand. And I hope I didn't waste my training time learning how to fight tanks in an engagement area instead of thugs in a courtyard. The problem boils down to the fact that, in spite of the misleading title, many operations other than war are clearly war at the tactical level, and no one would dispute the need to train for war at the tactical level.

But from here emerges the standard school of thought that normal battle-focused training and soldier discipline will meet our needs in these types of conflicts. After all, the argument continues, the tasks are the same; only the conditions have changed. Such reasoning is akin to the true but overly simplistic "daylight attack under different conditions." Likewise, the MOPP IV defense is just a MOPP 0 defense under different conditions. True enough, but no one would dare suggest that we don't need to train specifically for night attacks or for defenses in chemical environments.

The conditions in OOTW can be radically different from those for which our normal battle-focused training has prepared us. FM 100-2-1, *The Soviet Army Operations and Tactics*, 1984, teaches us to prepare to receive echeloned attacks. Thus, we have trained to fight a first echelon of two reinforced battalions, a second echelon of one reinforced battalion, and an antitank reserve (page 5-22). The 10th Mountain Division learned that the Somalis fight in echelons too—a first echelon of children throwing rocks, a second echelon of women with sticks, and a third echelon of men with AK-47s hiding behind the women and children (5 May 1994, JRTC briefing). The delta between these two types of echeloned attacks seems to me too wide to bridge without some specific attention to training.

But that special attention will not be forthcoming under the current policies against including OOTW in mission essential task lists (METLs). The doc-

trinal genesis of this policy appears to be in the statement in FM 100-5 that versatility will require "tactical units to adapt to different missions and tasks, some of which may not be on unit..." METLs (page 2-9). Taken at face value, this makes sense, but to expand it into a prohibition against putting OOTW tasks such as peace enforcement on a unit METL seems to contradict the basic training philosophy of "Don't have soldiers do something they are not trained to do" (U.S. Army Infantry School Assistant Commandant briefing to an Infantry Officer Advanced Course class) and the FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, 1990, injunction that "a unit must train as it plans to fight" (page 2-1).

The problem is that FM 25-101 defines a METL as "an unconstrained statement of tasks required to accomplish wartime missions" (page 2-2). Because OOTW operations are combat, not war, they seem to fall outside the realm of the METL. But OOTW is the war many units plan to fight, and hot spots such as Bosnia and Haiti seem likely sites for the OOTW role. I suggest, therefore, that we change the word "wartime" in the definition of METL to "combat." The whole thing is largely academic in any event because many light units have had noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO), an OOTW activity, on their METLs for years, and nobody raised an eyebrow. Why is NEO the exception?

I think the issue is that the Army is reluctant to sign up for more stuff to put on a plate that is already overflowing. Putting even the combat-type OOTWs on METLs and specifically training for them might send a message that we want to get involved in places where we really don't. Unfortunately, OOTW is a reality, and it doesn't seem to be going away. If it isn't going away, we may as well learn to live with it, and part of living with it is training for it.

It is easy to talk about versatility, but the human condition is such that we can do one thing better than two things, two things better than three, and we certainly do things we've trained for better than things we haven't trained for. The U.S.

LETTERS

Army has been conducting operations other than war for 200 years, during which OOTW has been called a variety of names. As we entered the Vietnam era, the name was "situations short of war," and the 1962 edition of FM 100-5 stated that "all units whose mission and capability create a possibility of their employment in situations short of war should receive specialized training in antiguerrilla warfare and riot control."

I think this line of thought demands some representation as we come to grips with OOTW as we know it today. The conflicts in Vietnam, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti were, or soon may be, combat even if they aren't war. We owe it to our soldiers to train them for combat, whether that combat is in the form of World War III or a peace enforcement, NEO, or counterinsurgency mission in some "operation other than war."

NAME WITHHELD

EDITOR'S NOTE: Although INFANTRY does not encourage letters submitted anonymously, this one is being published as an exception in the hope that it will lead to a useful discussion of OOTW issues.

UPCOMING COURSE

The 15th Annual Modeling, Simulation, and Gaming of Warfare course will be offered 6-9 September 1994 at the Georgia Institute of Technology, in

Atlanta, Georgia. The fee for the course is \$850.

This short course will provide a forum in which members of the military, industry, and academia can discuss the effects this emerging technology will have on the warfighter.

For further information, call (404) 894-2547.

**DEPARTMENT OF
CONTINUING EDUCATION**
Georgia Institute of Technology

SMOKE/OBSCURANTS SYMPOSIUM XVIII

The Smoke/Obscurants Symposium XVIII will be held 22-26 August 1994 at the Eglin Air Force Base Conference Center in Florida. The symposium is being co-sponsored by the U.S. Army Edgewood Research, Development, and Engineering Center and the U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center.

The theme is "Obscurants: The Smart Countermeasure." Topics to be presented include camouflage, concealment and deception, countermeasures, data analysis, assessment and evaluation, electromagnetic systems performance, health or environmental effects, modeling, natural and man-made obscurants applications, new and novel materials/system capabilities, nonmilitary applications, smoke systems and validation, verification, and accreditation.

Members of the Department of Defense, industry, academia, and allied nations are invited to attend.

Anyone who would like further information may call me at (804) 864-7604; FAX (804) 865-8721; or Van R. Jones, Technical Coordinator, commercial (410) 671-3668, DSN 584-3668, FAX (410) 671-3617.

LISA H. McCORMICK
Symposium Coordinator
Science and Technology Corporation
Hampton, Virginia

SHAEF/ETOUSA VETERANS ASSOCIATION

The 10th national reunion of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) will be held in San Diego, California, 7-10 October 1994.

SHAEF led the cross-channel invasion of Europe during World War II under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and ETOUSA was the Army's administrative headquarters during that war.

For additional information, write to me at 2301 Broadway, San Francisco, CA 94115; or call (415) 921-8322.

ALAN F. REEVES

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The new mailing address for INFANTRY is:

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INFANTRY NEWS



MINI-EYESAFE Laser Infrared Observation Set (MELIOS) is a lightweight, handheld, manportable distance measuring system. The device, which is approximately the size and shape of binoculars, will provide accurate ranges to targets at distances between 50 and 9,995 meters with an accuracy of plus or minus five meters.

The MELIOS, AN/PVS-6, will be employed worldwide in fire planning and adjustment, land navigation, reconnaissance, observation, information collection, and other related activities that require rapid, accurate range and direction information.

Eighty-four of these sets were issued in April 1994 to the 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Benning, and additional sets will be issued soon to the Ranger battalions at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, and Fort Lewis, Washington. Fielding will continue over the next two years.

A compass/vertical angle measurement (C/VAM) module is being developed for integration into the MELIOS. The C/VAM with MELIOS will be used by individual soldiers to accurately determine the direction and elevation of the target. This electronic device is capable of measuring the earth's magnetic field at a specific location within plus or minus 10 mils. Power and signal controls are fed from the MELIOS to C/VAM, and azimuth and elevation readings are returned to MELIOS to be displayed within its eyepiece.

The MELIOS alone or with C/VAM will be a combat multiplier for combat and combat support units and will improve their operational effectiveness on the modern battlefield. Additionally, with its eyesafe laser capability the MELIOS offers significantly better training opportunities than currently fielded laser range finders.

THE FOLLOWING is an update on the graphic training aids and manuals to be fielded during Fiscal Year 1994:

GTA 7-6-1, Fighting Position Construction, Infantry Leader's Reference Card (already fielded), identifies minimum criteria for a standard fighting position; provides standards for construction, basic Class IV requirements, and a checklist for each stage; and clarifies doctrinal inconsistencies.

GTA 7-1-34, U.S. Army Combat Arms Match Targets, supports the Army-wide requirement for field training for combat marksmanship matches.

GTA 7-1-35, Disassembly Layout Chart for MK 19 Grenade Machine Gun, 40mm, facilitates the training and evaluation process during initial, quarterly, and annual gunnery skills classification by aiding the disassembly of the components of the MK 19.

GTA 7-1-36, Disassembly Layout Chart for the M9 Semiautomatic Pistol, 9mm, supports One-Station Unit Training (OSUT) and other unit training to ensure qualification on the pistol.

Field Manual (FM) 23-25, Light Antiarmor Weapons, provides technical information, training techniques, and combat techniques for the employment of light antiarmor weapons, including the M72-series light antitank weapon (LAW) and the M136 AT4 light antiarmor weapon.

FM 23-34, TOW Weapons Systems, discusses the many changes in the TOW missile, TOW training, and opposing force (OPFOR) armored vehicles and countermeasures. It includes training information on the M220A1 (basic) and M220A2 TOW weapon systems and carriers (M966/M901-series).

ARTEP 7-8-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, provides a descriptive performance-oriented training program to assist leaders in training units. This



MTP applies to all infantry, light infantry, airborne, air assault, and Ranger platoons and squads organized under TOEs 07-075L000, 07-017L000, 07-037L000, 07-057L000, and 07-087L000.

ARTEP 7-10-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Company, provides a descriptive, performance-oriented training guide to assist leaders in training units. This MTP applies to all infantry, light infantry, airborne, air assault, Ranger, and mountain companies organized under TOEs 07-016L000, 07-017L000,

07-036L000, 07-037L000, 07-038L000, 07-056L000, 07-057L000, 07-058L000, 07-086L000, 07-087L000, 07-316L000, 07-317L000, 07-076L000, 07-077L000, and 07-078L000.

THE SCOPE-SHIELD II tactical communications system is being deployed worldwide following the successful completion of a rigorous qualification program. These users include air base ground-defense units, medical services units, and special operations forces for global deployment.



EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. Army Natick Research, Development, and Engineering Center recently participated in the Scientists and Engineers Field Experience with Soldiers program. This program gives Natick scientists, engineers, and researchers who work on equipment and clothing for soldiers a chance to experience first-hand what it is like to be a soldier.

Twelve people, five military and seven civilian, volunteered for this intensive, often grueling training at the Vermont Army National Guard's Mountain Warfare School.

The course is physically and mentally challenging. Key training objectives are knot tying, fixed ropes, rappelling, ice

climbing, mountain navigation, route planning, survival skills, crevasse rescue, and cross-country snow movement using skis, crampons, and snow shoes. The training culminates in a 72-hour field training exercise.

The participants learn certain tasks in classrooms and barracks areas—how to pull an ahkio sled, set up 10-man tents, and make sure the Yukon stove works properly. Then they use these skills in the field exercise.

The program promotes discussion between developers and soldiers; helping scientists and engineers understand what items are needed and how equipment they have designed is incorporated into a soldier's mission.

The FM system consists of light-weight handheld radios (AN/PRC-139(C)), base stations (AN/GRC-238), vehicle adapters (OF-228/U), tactical repeaters (AN/TRC-199), and accessories. The rugged package can operate reliably in harsh ground-combat conditions.

Scope Shield II provides an unprecedented level of interoperability on three frequency bands: 30-88 MHz, 136-174 MHz, and 403-470 MHz. This level of flexibility allows interoperability with both U.S. and foreign military and commercial radio systems. Two embedded NSA-endorsed Type 1 communications security (COMSEC) modes, VINSON and FED-STD-1023, allow communications between standard military systems as well as secured commercial systems

AN ITEM in the Enlisted Notes section of INFANTRY's March-April 1994 issue (page 47) identified the new SDTs for noncommissioned officers as "Skill Development Tests." The proper title is "Self Development Tests." As the item stated, "The SDT puts the responsibility for self-development and advancement on the individual NCO, not on the unit."

A NEW MULTI-chambered auto-injector drug delivery system is being developed that will store two injectable compounds separately and automatically administer them in sequence. Two separate auto-injectors are currently used for this procedure to self-inject atropine and pralidoxime chloride.

This new device is part of a family of advanced auto-injection systems for the fast, safe, convenient, and economical administration of a growing range of injectable pharmaceutical and biotechnology products.

The single-chamber auto-injector, which was used for nerve-gas antidote during the Persian Gulf War, is a pre-filled, spring-loaded, pen-like device that allows a patient to self-administer a precise dosage of medication immediately, without preparation and without seeing the needle.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM



The Platoon Team

CAPTAIN JOHN R. SUTHERLAND, III

One of the basics of combined arms operations is to avoid task organizing units below company level. Some of the arguments against mixing Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) and tanks are that the two systems are not complementary at platoon level; a platoon leader would be overtaxed trying to employ both systems; the tanks will lose their firepower effect; and the infantry will be spread too thin to protect the tanks and also accomplish their own mission.

Doctrine strongly discourages reorganizing platoons. The only common examples are of the platoon minus a squad or a section that has been retained as a company reserve, or that has been used to beef up the main effort. The doctrinal approach makes sense in the vast majority of the situations a company faces, but deviations from doctrine are sometimes necessary in the face of changes in mission or situation. The key to making a logical change is to understand exactly why it is being made and its relevance to doctrine.

A task-organized platoon is feasible and logical, given the proper set of circumstances. The decision must be made on the basis of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). What missions require a platoon consisting of two tanks and two Bradleys? What

enemy situation will allow—or force—you to task organize your platoons? In what terrain can you get away with this? Have you taken the time to train your troops to work as a small team?

Investing time in training is critical. As a lieutenant commanding an opposing force (OPFOR) motorized rifle company at the National Training Center (NTC), I employed my motorized rifle platoon in battle positions with one tank and two or three BMPs. Everyone in the OPFOR fought that way, and it seemed to work well. Every position had long-range antiarmor weapons on the BMPs and rapid-fire tank killers in the T-72 tanks, and there was plenty of infantry for security.

It was obvious, at least in the desert, that we didn't need to mass vehicles to mass fires. It was also obvious that a system on a vehicle was just a system and not a mysterious device that needed to be led by a branch-specific officer. The Armor lieutenants relied on the Infantry NCOs for guidance on employment, and the Infantry lieutenants likewise relied on the Armor NCOs. A leader is a leader and should be able to run whatever he gets. After all, when attrition sets in at the NTC, the leaders who are left take charge of whatever vehicles are still moving—whether they are tanks or Bradleys.

For the OPFOR, reconnaissance of the units in training at the NTC was easy. Tanks were always clumped up, by platoon, so it was easy to find the armor teams. We only needed to fix and bypass, while the enemy reconnaissance would find tanks dispersed throughout our positions, so it was difficult to identify strong—or weak—points.

As a result of this NTC experience, I was comfortable with mixed platoons and believed in combined arms all the way down to platoon level. When I took command of a company in the 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, during Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (1990-1991), I fully expected to face circumstances that would require this technique and developed a training program to facilitate it.

I decided that a platoon team with one tank and three Bradleys was not the best choice for a U.S. organization because of the close relationship that wing men develop. I therefore used platoon teams of two BFVs and two tanks each. Since my company team consisted of two infantry platoons and one armor platoon, I would have an infantry platoon team and an armor platoon team. The two platoon leaders and their NCOs were briefed, and the teams were set up. They rehearsed and maneuvered together every day for a few hours so

the leaders could get used to working together. The infantry platoon team was to be used for infantry-type missions—breaches in tight terrain and attacks against trenches. The armor platoon team was to fight on high-speed avenues of approach (AAs) where mutual support from other platoons would not be available. It was fully understood that the pure platoon was the standard and that the platoon team would be a contingency only.

To add to our flexibility, the fire support team hooked up a digital message device in my executive officer's (XO's) BFV and trained the crew to use it to call digital fire missions. This allowed redundancy in the company and also enabled me to send the company fire support officer or the XO with a platoon team to provide call for fire.

The stage was therefore set for employing the team whenever it might be needed, and I found three situations during the war that called for its employment:

In Saudi Arabia, our general defense plan was a large one. We oriented our main defense along the desert-access hard-surface road. We developed a number of separate defense and counter-attack options that covered some 80 kilometers. One of the defense options required us to move some 20 kilometers west to a small town with a good road that bypassed the main highway.

The defense of this town put us in an unusual position (Figure 1). The enemy would need to cross a road and pass through the town. South of the town, a large hill split the AA. The enemy could apply his main effort against one side or the other, or attack both sides at once. Since the eastern side of the hill provided the best bypass, this was the side the battalion weighted with one armor and one mechanized infantry company team. The western side of the mountain had a steep ridge that favored the employment of the antitank company equipped with improved TOW vehicles. A tank team (minus) would be the reserve from a battle position in depth, set to block penetrations.

Due south of the hill that divided the avenue of approach was a smaller hill

tied in with a fence that enclosed an animal pen. It was the only defensible position that could effectively engage both avenues. Someone would have to sit there, in the middle of the fire storm, and delay the enemy advance to allow uncommitted forces to reposition in depth, and we were that team.

We were faced with two solid high-speed avenues of approach and shallow engagement areas (EAAs) that prevented us from massing the fires of more than one platoon. Furthermore, my lieutenants and I would be the only ones to see this position before a fight; we could not bring the company here to rehearse. I put two platoon teams forward, one covering each avenue of approach, and kept the BFV-pure platoon in reserve to reinforce whichever platoon felt the enemy's main effort. This gave me tanks on both EAAs. Holding back armor on such a shallow EA would be dangerous against a determined armor-heavy advance. I felt that my "island" defense called for the use of the platoon teams.

The next time we needed a platoon team was four months later. We were planning the attack north into Iraq, and one of our intermediate objectives was to sever a main line of communication between Al Safwan and Al Busaya. The 6th French Armored Division and the

82d U.S. Airborne Division were to hit Safwan, and the 1st U.S. Infantry Division was to hit Busaya. My company was going to be set up between the two in a perfect position from which to block lateral repositioning or the enemy escape route along the only good road.

The road was set in a deep valley. As seen on aerial photos, the width of the valley appeared to vary from 200 to 400 meters wide, with only one or two ways into it and maybe a bridge or two over it. It was the perfect place for a light infantry battalion to take up blocking positions and dominate the road. The enemy's light companies were supposed to be equipped with chemical rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and one tank platoon per company consisting of three T-55 tanks. The valley floor could accommodate only one company and, once again, it was ours.

We were faced with a light infantry threat, a thick obstacle belt, tanks, and a very narrow front (Figure 2). We could advance only with the platoons deployed and traveling in column. A plow tank and a combat engineer vehicle with mine rake were our best breakers. The company's infantry was the best for clearing trenches or bunkers and for forward reconnaissance to report on the situation around the valley's sharp




Figure 1. Platoon team defense




Figure 2. Platoon team defile drill

bends. The best suppression weapon was the Bradley's 25mm cannon, firing high explosive rounds.

I decided to use two platoon teams. The infantry team would lead to provide dismounted reconnaissance to clear the bends in the valley. Because of their survivability against RPGs and T-55s, the plow tank and his wing man would lead, and the BFVs would follow to

clear bunkers. A pure BFV platoon would trail with the mine rake to act as team reserve to reinforce the lead platoon with breaching and infantry. I felt this approach gave me the most flexibility. As it turned out, the aerial photos had been deceiving, and the enemy had not been smart enough to cover this important area. But we did advance in this manner.

The third occasion to use the platoon team was along the Euphrates Highway on the night of 28 February, the next to last night of the fighting. We were caught up in the farming area, which was interspersed with numerous berms two to four meters high (Figure 3). Our position at approximately 0300 was highly compartmented. The only defensible terrain for the battalion was one kilometer south of the highway. We tied in the battalion and established our defense.

My company was to hold the left flank, closest to the road and to 1st Brigade, our closest flank unit. The command group realized there was a gap between the 2d and 1st Brigades and the only real high-speed avenue of approach went right through it. The commander could not shift the entire battalion without causing a gap within the 2d Brigade sector, yet we had to cover the road and make contact with the 1st Brigade. We had taken artillery fire that night and had captured many enemy troops moving east and west through the valley. Reports were that we were chasing the Hammurabi Division of the Republican Guard only 30 kilometers ahead of us, and that it might decide to counterattack, stand and fight, or continue to run. The artillery helped convince us that a counterattack was still a possibility.

My company received orders to move to the road to cover the high-speed avenue of approach and link up with 1st Brigade. I told the battalion commander that my company would move shortly but that we first needed to transfer about 40 enemy prisoners of war. He said he did not want the entire company to move, just one platoon. This meant I would send a platoon one kilometer away, unsupported, and separated from me by numerous berms. Since the platoon would then straddle the high-speed avenue of approach, it needed infantry for security, TOWs for long-range antitank fires, and tanks to provide rapid fire, close tank-killing ability, and survivability. Since the darkness and the berms would put the platoon out of my view, it also needed artillery support. I therefore made this platoon an




Figure 3. Platoon on high-speed avenue of approach

armor team with the fire support vehicle (FSV). Covering the avenue of approach was an armor mission. The platoon would find the 1st Brigade, coordinate the flanks, and position along the road favoring my own position. The FSV, tanks, and TOWs would be used to delay the enemy while we deployed, and the infantry would provide protection from the Iraqi soldiers still wandering in the area. I felt that an isolated platoon on the most obvious avenue of approach, surrounded by drifting soldiers, would need a balanced force to

deal with the numerous threats.

The task-organized platoon is not a cure-all. It should be recognized as an exception to the doctrinal rule and, at the very least, an option to be considered. The factors of METT-T will determine when and why platoons should be task organized.

A commander should trust his junior leaders to handle this organization and should train for platoon team operations so the group can get used to each other. Some specialized standing operating procedures would help, along with

remembering that massed fires—not necessarily massed troops or equipment—are the key.

Captain John R. Sutherland, III, is an Infantry Officer Advanced Course small group instructor. He previously served in the OPFOR battalion during 44 rotations at the NTC and commanded a company in the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He is a 1983 ROTC graduate of Northern Arizona University.

The 21st Century Land Warrior

CAPTAIN GREGORY J. DYEKMAN

The Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab at Fort Benning is developing a program that will prepare the dismounted soldier for combat well into the 21st century. It begins with a vision of the future dismounted soldier, which is a modular, integrated battlefield fighting system appropriately called the 21st Century Land Warrior. The joint program will support the dismounted land forces of the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations forces by making use of emerging commercial technologies and exploiting microelectronics.

This technology push to make high-performance electronics smaller and more rugged will provide the dismounted land warrior with lightweight, man-packed communications, data networking, and sensor modules; protection from a full range of threats; more lethal weaponry; and the ability to operate freely in extreme temperatures and over most terrain. These improvements will give the soldier a technological advantage over his potential adversaries that will contribute to the Nation's ability to deter conflicts or, at least, to win them

decisively and swiftly with as few casualties as possible.

Situational awareness and real-time battlefield information are keys to success on the modern battlefield. Dramatic improvements in both lethality and survivability can be achieved through a direct link between modern dismounted

individual soldier, the small unit, and the ground and air forces at higher echelons. It will also reduce the risk of fratricide and allow precision munitions to be used more effectively.

Commanders will be able to maneuver forces and dictate battlefield tempo as never before. The 21st Century Land Warrior will be given a tremendous increase in command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities; this will enable small units to better control battlefield movement and tempo, leading to more controlled dispersion and improved survivability and lethality for the entire force.

To achieve this vision, the Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab is using the 21st Century Land Warrior Top-Level Demonstration (TLD). The cornerstone and integrating effort of the 21st Century Land Warrior TLD is the Generation II Soldier Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD).

Generation II Soldier ATD

The Generation II Soldier ATD builds on the Soldier Integrated Protective



soldiers and the rest of the force. Through this network, dismounted warriors will receive digital information from leaders and squad members and will provide continuous real-time information to commanders. This link will improve situational awareness for the

Ensemble (SIPE) ATD (Fiscal Years 1990-1993), which pioneered soldier-oriented research and development. The SIPE ATD was specifically aimed at the individual soldier capabilities that could come from the integration and aggregation of state-of-the-art technologies applied through a systems approach.

SIPE provided better individual and collective performance at night and in obscured and chemical environments through improvements in lethality, command and control, survivability, and mobility. For operational use in the 21st century, however, further improvements are still needed in several areas: power, electro-optics resolution, sensor range and accuracy, command, control, and communications miniaturization, and overall integration.

The primary objective of Generation II Soldier is to develop an advanced, affordable, integrated—yet modular and interoperable—head-to-toe individual fighting system that will reach beyond SIPE capabilities but at a weight and bulk that is acceptable to soldiers.

The goal is to integrate various electronic components, individual equipment, weapons, and hazard protection into a functioning, balanced, and unified system of modular subsystems that can be used in various ways. The modular approach will enable commanders to achieve a balance between performance and protection in responding to varying mission (threat and operational) requirements; it will also allow for the task organization that makes the best use of a unit's capabilities.

The Generation II Soldier System will consist of the following five major subsystems:

Integrated Headgear Subsystem (IHS). The IHS will use the soldier's ballistic protective helmet shell as a platform for communications, hearing augmentation, an integrated night vision mobility sensor, and a high-resolution display for sensor and computer output.

Individual Soldier's Computer/Radio (ISC/R). This voice-controlled, secure computer/radio will create, store, and display information; provide an interface with Generation II soldier sensors (chemical detectors, personal status

monitors, thermal sensors, range finders, combat identification interrogators and receivers); provide position and navigation data through an inertial navigation device linked to a global positioning system (GPS) receiver; and provide wireless transmission of voice, data, digital reports, and imagery (thermal and video). The soldier will view information through a hand-held color display or through the integrated headgear subsystem display. The ISC/R will be linked through the single-channel ground and airborne radio subsystem (SINCGARS) into the combined arms command and control digitized network, providing a selection of real-time information directly from individual soldiers to higher echelon commands.

Weapon Interface Subsystem (WIS). This interface with the Objective Individual Combat Weapon of the future will allow a soldier to view the weapon reticle on his headgear display. The Generation II Soldier System will also be compatible with other infantry weapon systems (such as Javelin, multi-purpose individual munition, M16A2, M60, M249, M203).

Microclimate Conditioning (MCC) Subsystem. The MCC will be a self-contained, lightweight, backpack portable cooling system that will improve the soldier's performance in temperate-to-hot climates, especially when he is wearing chemical protective gear. This subsystem will maintain an individual soldier's thermal equilibrium for up to four hours of operation. (*See also MCC item in INFANTRY, March-April 1994, page 8.*)

Survivability Subsystem. This subsystem will give the soldier better multiple-threat protection (primarily through signature reduction and small-arms ballistic protection for the torso) and will include an advanced load-carrying capability that distributes the load for maximum comfort.

The following additional technology efforts are to be integrated with the Generation II Soldier System ATD and to support the 21CLW TLD:

The Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) Technical Demonstration (TD). The operational and

organizational goal is to provide a single weapon to replace the M16A2 rifle, the M203 grenade launcher, and selected M249 machineguns. The weapon is envisioned as an integrated system highlighted by full-solution fire control that can identify and acquire a target and provide feedback on the engagement; kinetic energy projectiles; and fragmenting air-burst munitions.

Thermal Weapon Sight Mine Detection (TD). The Battle Lab will assess the feasibility of using thermal imagery through this sight as an effective means of detecting mines. An interface between the soldier computer and the integrated helmet system will alert the soldier to the presence of a mine field and give him a means of avoiding the mines when crossing it.

Forward Observer-Forward Air Controller ATD. The FO/FAC ATD, sponsored by the Marine Corps, will demonstrate the soldier's ability to accurately determine his own location and that of a target, identify a target, and adjust fire.

Commercial Communications Technology Test Bed. This program, sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, will demonstrate commercial communications hardware and the linkage of the individual warrior to the other force structure elements, thereby showing improvements over the present SINCGARS.

Integrated Sight Modules TD. This effort will demonstrate the integration of range finder, compass, combat identification interrogation, and transponder elements to support OICW and FO/FAC.

High-Resolution Helmet Displays and Sensor Modules TD. This TD will demonstrate advanced display and sensor capabilities under a horizontal integration approach for land warriors, helicopter crews, and armored crews.

Essential to the improved operational effectiveness of the soldier is the best possible integration of the collective 21st Century Land Warrior Generation II Soldier subsystems and components and, as a result, the most effective relationship among them. There are numerous benefits to be derived from 21CLW

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TLD that will greatly improve the soldier's ability to succeed on the future battlefield.

The following are specific capability benefits for the individual soldier in these areas:

Lethality. The sensory interface with advanced and existing individual weapons and with the integrated sight module will allow soldiers to bring more lethal munitions to bear faster and more accurately. Individual soldiers will be capable of detecting targets at longer ranges and throughout a full spectrum of battlefield conditions (at night, through obscurants, wearing NBC protective gear). The 21CLW will be able to engage targets more quickly, especially at night, as well as targets that are not exposed (indirect viewing). Forward deployed soldiers will be able to send real-time target data directly to the combined arms team on the battlefield, including target coordinates and near real-time target imagery (at night and through obscurants).


Survivability. Modular multi-threat protection with vital area coverage will provide protection from selected assault rifles, machineguns, and indirect fire flechettes. Integrated combat identification transponders and interrogators will play an important role in reducing fratricide and increasing battlefield situational awareness.

Other planned 21CLW capabilities that will improve survivability include signature reduction (visual, near infrared, thermal, noise, and electronic), in-stride mine avoidance, and a chemical detection sensor linked through the ISC/R. The chemical sensor, linked to the computer, will generate an automatic report of the detection location and the type of threat. Adjacent units will be able to define areas of contamination and advise subordinates as needed.

Command and Control. Improved situational awareness will be realized through "networking" real-time digitized position and navigation capability through a GPS receiver, digitized maps, and an inertial navigation device, all integrated through the ISC/R. Awareness of both the enemy and friendly situations will be improved. Soldiers will

be able to view any combination of overlays, including friendly, enemy, fire support, and obstacles. Decision making, planning, and reporting will be faster. The computer will provide optimal route planning with respect to mission requirements, known or suspected enemy locations, ease of trafficability, operational control measures, water and other environmental hazards, and GPS satellite visibility. The soldier will be able to transmit and receive any series of preformatted digital reports, including SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment) and call for fire.

Mobility. GPS and improved situational awareness will improve the soldier's ability to navigate. The helmet-



mounted sensors will also improve his ability to move on the battlefield at night or in adverse weather. A total systems design will also reduce the overall soldier load.

Sustainability. An improved modular approach to individual strength will permit the soldier to operate in greater environmental extremes through the use of the microclimate conditioning equipment. The MCC subsystem and integrated, modular NBC protective gear will permit soldiers not only to survive but also to perform their missions effectively for longer times in a contaminated battlefield environment. A personal-status monitor linked to the ISC/R will provide individual guidance to sustain performance and prevent injury.

The 21st Century Land Warrior/Generation II Soldier ATD will consist of two demonstrations with differing approaches and objectives. The primary objective of an interim 1996 demonstration will be to ensure the fundamental viability and capability of the digitized network. This demonstration is expected to consist of using initial prototypes

to ensure hardware functionality, human factors compatibility, and integration with developing command and control protocols.

A culminating field demonstration slated for 1998 is expected to consist of a light infantry platoon conducting a series of situational training exercises or field training exercises to demonstrate enhanced lethality and survivability as a result of linking the soldier into the digitized command and control network. The system will then transition to engineering development under the control of the Program Manager-Soldier. As a result of this effort, it is anticipated that less engineering development will be required to field the entire 21st Century Land Warrior.

The Battle Lab will play a major role in defining the 21CLW through the rapidly emerging Land Warrior Test Bed. A simulation suite of constructive combat models and man-in-the-loop (virtual reality) simulations will quantify the technical and operational effectiveness of the individual and combined demonstrations. These analytical tools will play an important part in guiding the overall effort.

The 21st Century Land Warrior will bear increasing responsibility for the success of our Nation's policies and objectives. The program must maintain capabilities that more than match those of any threat on the future battlefield. Arriving virtually unannounced anywhere there is a crisis, the 21st Century Land Warrior will be a key instrument in the dominance of land forces.

The Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab continues to be committed to ensuring that the dismounted combat soldier has what he needs to remain the key element of forced entry and the cornerstone of force projection.

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Concepts and Technology For the Soldier

MAJOR HAROLD W. WEBB

To win on today's battlefield, our forces must be more lethal, mobile, and agile than their adversaries. They must also be better able to survive against current and future threat weapons and munitions, as well as to anticipate and provide sustainment requirements under the most adverse conditions.

In support of these requirements, the Department of Defense has developed a new program, Advanced Concepts and Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), that will focus advanced technologies and speed the acquisition and fielding of these systems. The U.S. Army Infantry School's Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab is teamed with the U.S. Army Missile Command to conduct one of the first ACTDs—the Rapid Force Projection Initiative/Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (RFPI/EFOGM) ACTD. It will develop advanced missile systems for fielding in limited numbers during Fiscal Year 1997.

The objective of this ACTD is to provide a way to explore the ability to expand battlespace at brigade level. This will be accomplished through simulation and Battle Lab warfighting experiments conducted with units of the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). This ACTD will provide the ability to conduct essential intelligence and real-time communications to support the precision engagement of threat armored forces and helicopters beyond the line of sight. It will give the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) battle labs and schools a means of exploring issues and refining concepts, doctrine, and requirements. Through the development

of advanced technology fieldable demonstrators, doctrine, training, leader development, and organizational issues can be fully explored as the Army and Marine Corps move into the 21st century.

This advanced equipment will be demonstrated by a selected light, air assault, or airborne unit from FORSCOM. The unit will also retain the equipment for a two-year extended demonstration period in 1999 and 2000. The concept of employment will be



based on the Non-Line of Sight-Combined Arms (NLOS-CA) concept developed by the Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab. This concept is based on an extensive analysis of technologies and force-on-force simulations. Tactics, techniques, and procedures developed during the NLOS-CA concept evaluation program will serve as the baseline for the demonstration.

The expansion of battlespace to gain an advantage over enemy forces is critical to success in battle. This expansion is achieved through manned and

unmanned target acquisition, effective—and survivable—command and control, and precision direct and indirect fire capabilities.

Expanding the battlespace of combat forces achieves four distinct advantages:

- Enemy forces are destroyed before they can effectively engage friendly forces.
- The vulnerability of a friendly force is reduced through increased dispersion.
- The use of a base of fire at extended ranges increases the ability to maneuver.
- The maneuver commander's flexibility is improved through the unit's ability to conduct operations at a tempo faster than that of the enemy forces.

Expanding battlespace allows simultaneous engagement by the variety of warfighting systems available to the task force commander. These, combined with the effects of deep attacks, force the enemy to fight several threats at the same time. These simultaneous attacks in both the deep and close battles overwhelm the enemy and lead to his decisive defeat.

In operations other than war, the expansion of battlespace allows the commander to complete his mission with greater situational awareness for greater force protection.

The EFOGM can engage high-value targets with precision at extended ranges, allowing the maneuver commander to extend his battlespace and to mass fires while maintaining force dispersion. The system enables the forces to strike enemy targets throughout the

close battle area at the same time and in depth.

Examples of high-value targets engaged by EFOGM include enemy command and control facilities, air defense assets, engineering assets, helicopters, and selected armored vehicles. The commander can plan and execute precision long-range fires while in defilade—to targets in defilade at ranges to 15 kilometers.

EFOGM fires are synchronized with the available reconnaissance and target acquisition assets from national level—such as satellites and Joint STARS—to unit level, as well as direct and indirect fire systems. With this extension of battlespace, a commander can use rapid and precision fires to decisively affect the quantity, quality, and integrity of enemy combined arms force before engaging it with direct fire weapons.

The EFOGM system enables the maneuver commander to influence the tempo of battle through strikes on selected command and control, air defense, and engineer vehicles. The resulting

confusion created by the loss of leaders and combat support assets can slow, or even momentarily stop, enemy units. This allows the maneuver commander to engage targets with other fire support systems, such as artillery, attack helicopters, close air support, and other precision guided munitions. With this precision fire synchronized, the attack has a much greater effect. Enemy forces beyond the range of their own direct fire weapons are much less effective. Enemy forces engaged by direct fire ultimately become disorganized, lose combat power, and pose a lesser threat.

EFOGM further enhances the maneuver commander's actions by striking enemy helicopters forward of the forward line of troops and along the flanks of maneuver forces. This significantly reduces the enemy threat to friendly armored vehicles and increases force protection.

The RFPI/EFOGM ACTD system differs somewhat from the original NLOS-CA program in terms of hardware, funding, program management,

and impact on the Army acquisition process. A global positioning system card has been added to the missile for increased precision. The ACTD will produce a number of demonstrator fire units and missiles for field testing by units, which will provide data needed to support the acquisition of this system. The concept of demonstrators being retained by a FORSCOM unit is also a change in the normal research and development component of the acquisition process.

The Infantry School is leading the way in exploring ways to provide the combined arms force with the ability to overmatch potential threats, now and into the 21st century.

Major Harold W. Webb is assigned to the Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab. He previously served as an assistant brigade S-3 in the 82d Airborne Division and in various mechanized infantry assignments. He is a 1977 ROTC graduate of the University of Alabama and holds a master's degree from Texas Tech University.

Getting Promoted

Advice for Officers

COLONEL RICHARD L. STRUBE

There you are, newly commissioned, just settling into your first duty assignment, eager and excited about the future. Things just couldn't be better—until the murmurings begin: The company commander was just passed over for promotion to major; the S-3 was not selected for the Command and General Staff College; the battalion commander didn't make the cut for the Army War College;

and the brigade executive officer was hit by the Selective Early Retirement Board.

Suddenly, your confidence is shaken, and you begin asking yourself what it all means for your own career. Will you make captain? How about major? Lieutenant colonel? What about schooling and command? If all these good leaders are having trouble, what chance do you have? How do you get promoted, or

even selected for schooling?

In this article, I will try to provide some answers that may serve as a useful guide. Over the years, I have seen a number of articles address these same questions, and I've never seen one that contained a magic formula. This one won't guarantee anything either, but it may provide a few ideas that will help you achieve your career goals.

Let me begin by offering some assurance that you need not be "outstanding" to succeed, if you define success as reaching the rank of colonel, as I have. I have been an infantryman for 26 years but have never been in combat. Although I was never centrally selected for battalion command, I spent four consecutive years commanding battalions. While a promotable major, I received a third block senior rating on my Officer Evaluation Report as a battalion XO. I completed the Army War College through the corresponding studies program, not the resident course. My highest award is the Meritorious Service Medal. I am not joint-service qualified, am not a linguist, and have no special skill that mandated promotion to colonel. In spite of what seems like a number of negative discriminators, I have been promoted with my year group from second lieutenant on. If it can happen to me, it can happen to you.

BASIC RULES

My experience has taught me ten basic rules that have worked for me, and they may work for you as well:

All jobs are important, so do your best in each job you're given. The Army does not create jobs just to keep people busy. Each one, no matter how trivial or mundane it may seem at first glance, is important to the overall Army mission. As a commander once told me, if you're assigned to inventory sheets in the Quartermaster laundry, then be the best sheet counter that laundry ever had.

Learn to read and write well. Don't let the fact that you have a college degree fool you into thinking you're skilled at these critical aspects of professionalism. Each year, more than a third of the officers selected to attend the resident Command and General Staff College Course are placed in remedial writing programs. If you can't read and write well, you'll have great difficulty keeping up with your peers.

Stay as close to troops as you can for as long as you can. The things you'll learn as a troop leader at the

muddy-boot level will be of great value later. Don't be too eager to get in a staff job; there will be plenty of those when you're a field grade officer. Stay with troops as long as you can and fight to get back to troops whenever you have a chance.

Never avoid a command assignment of any type. Sure, commanding a rifle company is your prime objective, but don't rule out command of the headquarters company, the replacement detachment, a recruiting company, a training company, any company! Command is command. And I believe this rule applies at battalion level as well.

Develop a personal professional development program. Read, study, and write about your profession. Attend schools whenever you have an opportunity. But don't attend schools with a badge-hunter mentality. Attend them to develop your skills, improve your professionalism, and increase your self-confidence. The more you know about all of the complex and difficult tasks required of you, the less likely you'll be misled and confused when others begin offering advice. Read regulations, field manuals, and the appropriate technical manuals.

Have fun. If you don't truly enjoy being an officer, with all that it entails, then change professions. Serving as an Army officer is not just a job or an alternative career; it is a way of life, and if you don't enjoy it, don't stay with it. This is not to suggest that you must be single-minded and one-dimensional. There is ample room for a family, hobbies, and whatever outside interests you may prefer.

Maintain a leadership journal. It will be a rare day when you don't observe some act of leadership, either good or bad. A daily or weekly journal in which you enter observed examples can be a great tool. Note the event, then develop your thoughts about what it means, and the lessons to be learned from it. Review your journal regularly, and try to make it a handy reference for leading and managing as you move through your evolution as a leader.

When you're right, act like it. There may be occasions when you're

right about something and it's painful to maintain your position, but you must. Never avoid the hard issues, when you're right. It may take all of your moral character at times, but when you're right, hang tough! The Army does a pretty good job of winnowing out those who should not be in positions of leadership, but every now and then one slips through and creates some painful situations. Most of us will encounter only one or two of these people in our careers, but they are there, and you can't hide from your responsibility to do what is right in spite of them.

Have a goal, and work toward it. Ask yourself what it is that will allow you to say, on the day you leave the service, "I satisfied my goal." For some, it is to achieve the rank of colonel, and for others, to command a battalion. For some, only being a general is enough. The important thing is that you must have a goal; only then can you really plan to achieve that goal. It is entirely possible, even probable, that this goal will change over the years, but if you don't start out knowing where you want to go, you may not get there.

In all things, at all times, be competent, confident, and professional. No further discussion on this is required.

These ten rules have helped me, and they can help you, too. There are some other important things, but they are usually beyond your control: It helps to be working for great leaders. It helps to have great subordinates working for you. And you can't dismiss the effect that pure luck may have on some of this. But if you're prepared you can normally capitalize on fortune when it appears.

Never forget that you are your own best career manager. Yes, your branch assignment officers will help you all they can. They will advise and counsel, and they will do so with honesty and candor. But their mission and your career goals may not always coincide. Only you know what your career goals are. Tell your leaders, and tell your branch assignment officers. Seek guidance on the best road to follow to reach your goal. Tell the branch people what you want to do. Seek options; then

make a choice. As you move toward your goal, follow the ten rules. I can give you no guarantees, but they have been successful for me.

There are two more things that I have found vital to my career, and they may be vital to yours as well. First, I believe it is essential to have deep faith in a supreme being. Nothing else will help as much when things are not going as you have planned. Second, and of absolute necessity to me, is to have the

strength, support, and love of a family. This is a special kind of job, and most of us cannot do it alone.

The career you have embarked upon can be a wonderful one, full of challenge, reward, and deep satisfaction. You may notice that I have only touched on the subjects of ethics and integrity. My view is that if you don't have them, you'll run off your road anyway and won't need the ten rules.

Do your best, enjoy it, and have a

wonderful time serving your Nation and its soldiers.

Colonel Richard L. Strube, Jr., has served in personnel management positions at PERSCOM and is now a member of the Army Council of Review Boards, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. He was commissioned through the Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning in 1970. He is a graduate of Kansas State University and holds a master's degree from Central Michigan University.

Getting Promoted

Advice for Staff Sergeants

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TIMOTHY A. SCULLY

Promotions to sergeant first class and above are now based on Department of the Army (DA) centralized selection instead of local boards. The 1993 Sergeant First Class (SFC) Promotion/Qualitative Management Program (QMP) Board reviewed thousands of records.

The board consisted of a brigadier general, who served as President, and 60 colonels, lieutenant colonels, command sergeants major, and sergeants major. Having served as a member of the board's Infantry-Special Forces panel, I want to offer my observations on the workings of this board, along with some advice on how you can improve your chances of being selected for promotion by a future board.

Actual selections for promotion were made by functional area panels. The Infantry-Special Forces panel looked at all soldiers in the promotion zone in career management field (CMF) 11 (MOSSs 11B, 11C, 11M), CMF 18

(MOSSs 18B, 18C, 18D, 18E, 18F), and CMF 37.

The panel members represented the entire spectrum of infantry and special operations forces: a former infantry brigade commander, two former battalion commanders (one infantry and one Special Forces), three command sergeants major (one major command, one division, and one Special Forces group), and two staff sergeants major (one major command and one field army). On the basis of this experience, needless to say, we had a pretty good idea of what we were looking for in our future sergeants first class, and possible command sergeants major for the Army of the year 2010.

The panel based its selections for promotion on written guidance from the Secretary of the Army, the proponent branches, and the panel's objective standards. Panel standards ensure that NCOs are examined only in regard to what is expected of their CMF contem-

poraries and that the voting standards within the panel were consistent.

Every record was then randomly selected and "blindly" voted on by three panel members, each of whom reviewed it separately. Each file was given a numerical score ranging from "6+" (Promote immediately) to "1" (Do not promote—Select for QMP). The sum of the three scores produced a rank ordering of the files in each MOS, and promotions were made on the basis of the number authorized by DA for each CMF (select objective). Secondary zone files are voted on and rank ordered the same way and, when the quality of secondary zone files clearly outweighs that of primary zone files in that MOS, secondary zone promotions are made, up to the secondary zone select objective. In brief, every file is voted on and scored on the basis of its individual merits, and the number promoted in each MOS is based upon numbers established by DA.

Our panel rated each file on the basis

of its four components—the official photo; the Personal Qualification Record (PQR) (DA Form 2 and 2-1); the Performance Fiche (P Fiche) of the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF); and additional paper documents accepted by the President of the board.

The idea that a promotion board spends only one minute looking at a file is a myth. Normally, the first panel member “opened the file,” conducting a detailed look at the record and making notes on the Board Personnel Data Summary (PDS) sheet, which reflects the strengths or weaknesses of the file for the other two members. The others also review the entire file, using the PDS notes to cue them on specific places to look to formulate the vote. Early in the voting process, I took 15 minutes to “open a file,” but after a few days of looking at records I found that five to seven minutes was the norm for an average file. With the PDS notes as a guide, I spent significantly less time when I was the second or third voter.

Advice

Needless to say, being promoted to SFC is not easy. The competition is tough, and only the best make the cut. Your selection for promotion is not a reward for your past performance but rather a board’s vote of confidence that you will perform well at a higher level of responsibility. The board bases that vote of confidence on indicators of success as shown in your file.

This means that a board member shouldn’t be the first to review your records. You should. Your place on a promotion order of merit list will be determined by the strength of the panel vote on the components of your file. If you haven’t reviewed them recently, you should. Then have someone else look at them, someone who will tell you the truth about any shortcomings. You may be surprised. The four components are the following:

Official Photo. Your official photo is your personal appearance before the board, so look at it closely. Have a new photo taken as soon as you are promoted to each rank (between staff sergeant and command sergeant major), and then



The future belongs to leaders who go after the tough jobs and then do them well. In the Infantry, the tough jobs are generally those that involve leading soldiers, and the more soldiers, the tougher the job.

update it at least every five years. Make sure it is technically correct and that it reflects only the individual awards and decorations shown on your DA Form 2-1. Leave your unit citations, jump boots, blue cords, and backgrounds for jump wings at home. Get a good haircut, trim the mustache, and stand tall. After the photo is developed, look at it closely to make sure it is what you want the board to see. Even if you routinely need a waiver to meet weight requirements, it is better to have a photo in your file than to let the panel think you may be “too fat to photo.”

PQR. Panel members spend a great deal of time looking at the PQR (DA Form 1 and 2-1); it is the source document for cross-checking the information found in NCO evaluation reports and the photo. If the photo shows a Combat Infantryman’s Badge (CIB), the panel will look for the Combat Infantryman’s Badge on the DA Form 2-1. Likewise, the EIB is seen as a mark of individual excellence against which all infantrymen can be measured. Our panel looked closely at the DA Form 2-1 for a history of civilian and military education, promotions, and assignments. This form was seen as the most important document because of the candidate’s signature on the certification statement attesting to its accuracy. The panel was

not impressed when an NCO had not taken the time or effort to update and certify his records.

OMPF. The OMPF consists of three parts—service, performance, and restricted files—and the board is authorized to review only the performance fiche. The “P Fiche” contains both academic efficiency reports (AERs) and regular NCOERs, as well as commendatory and disciplinary (“C and D”) actions. All actions are on the fiche chronologically from oldest to most recent.

AERs are viewed as seriously as regular NCOERs because they reflect, not just a level of military education, but also professional excellence measured against contemporaries. NCOERs based on tough, high-risk jobs are worth far more than those based on relatively easy jobs. All jobs are important and should be done well, but the future belongs to leaders who go after the tough jobs and then do them well. In the infantry, the tough jobs are generally those that involve leading soldiers, and the more soldiers, the tougher the job.

The numerous documents in the “C and D” file often hide the really good things in the file, but they do not camouflage adverse actions. When a serious flaw is cited in an NCOER, the board member looks for a cross-reference

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

action in the "C and D." Although an Article 15 may be on the Restricted Fiche, the documents that revoke the Drill Sergeant/Recruiter Badge or deny a Good Conduct Medal definitely tell the board that the soldier has seriously crossed the line of good behavior.

While the panel members are reviewing NCOERs, they also look for a pattern of personal excellence. An NCO's real qualities are evident from his assignments and raters over a number of years. One great or poor NCOER will not make or break a career, unless it involves a Congressional Medal of Honor or a problem with "values." The panel members are bright enough to see through a personality clash and a "soft move" or obvious "love affair" between the NCO and his rating chain. The bullets on the NCOERs tell it all. Unsupported "Excellence" bullets are generally discounted by the board, and "fluff" bullets—which often mask real excellence—hurt the rated NCO far more than they help. A rater's comments should be specific and concise and should support the rating. Raters should just be honest and do what is right; the pattern of performance will outweigh or discount the "fluff" NCOER.

The final items considered by the board are the "hard copy" NCOERs and punitive actions that arrive after the zone cut-off date, and letters to the President of the board. This is not an invitation for an NCO to send a copy of each letter and certificate he has received since he came into the Army. Most of the documents I reviewed did more professional damage than good by highlighting blemishes on the record. Before sending a letter to the

President of the board, insist that someone else review it along with your microfiche to see whether it helps your cause or hurts it.

After all of these records are considered and voted upon, the file is scored and rank ordered by MOS, while the few NCOs with serious career flaws are referred to the QMP Board (a separate action).

Voting is difficult because only about 15 percent of the files clearly say "promote now" and another 15 percent say "do not promote." The remaining 70 percent are the challenge.

To gauge where you are professionally, you only have to look at your records and compare them with some obvious marks of professional excellence for promotion to SFC in the infantry:


- Success in a platoon sergeant, drill sergeant, or equally high-risk job.
- A pattern of well-documented excellence in NCOERs and AERs.
- Exceeding the standard in the Primary Leadership Development Course and the Basic NCO Course (AERs again).
- About two years of college credit; more would be better.
- An Army Physical Fitness Test Badge notation in NCOER/not needing a waiver to meet height-weight standard.
- The Expert Infantryman's Badge, which says it all.
- A pattern of awards recognizing superior service (Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal).
- Completion of a special qualification course (Ranger, Jumpmaster, Mortar Platoon Leader, Bradley Master Gunner, TOW Trainer).

These items are not absolutely necessary for promotion; the whole man is considered, and each has different opportunities. And if you have a blemish on your record, do not despair. If you've made a mistake, demonstrate that you know better and then recover brilliantly from that mistake. Go for the toughest jobs, and do them well.

You can always make yourself a better leader, a better staff sergeant, thus making yourself more valuable to the Army and individually competitive for promotion. Above all, don't quit. Ask yourself, "When was the last time I dug a defense or led the attack?" If it wasn't recently, get out where you can, and do it.

Getting promoted is not hard. You can be one of those selected if you do every assignment the best you can—even while attending service schools—keep working on college credit, make weight without a waiver, earn the Expert Infantryman's and Physical Fitness Badges, and go to the special qualification schools. Above all, stay out of trouble. Check and update your records, get your picture taken, and keep working on the hard jobs—the ones that lead to first sergeant. If you do, you will be well on your way to continued success.

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy A. Scully recently completed the Army War College. He previously commanded a battalion in the 82d Airborne Division and served in the Old Guard, the XVIII Airborne Corps, and U.S. Army Europe. He is a 1974 ROTC graduate of the University of Florida and has written several previous articles for publication in INFANTRY.




FIFTY YEARS AGO IN WORLD WAR II

JULY-AUGUST 1944

By the mid-summer of 1944, the Allied foothold in France had expanded rapidly as reinforcements poured across the Channel and built up momentum for the offensive that would sweep the Wehrmacht from territories they had occupied for four years. Rome was in Allied hands, B-29 bombers had begun hitting the home islands of Japan, and Guam would soon fall to U.S. Marine and Army units. American bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force continue to hammer the Ploesti oilfields of Rumania, and troops of the First White Russian Front recapture Brest-Litovsk. The American VI Corps' landing on France's southern coast forces Germany to turn and fight in yet another direction.

These and other highlights of World War II are drawn from Bud Hannings' *A Portrait of the Stars and Stripes*, Volume II, available for \$50.00 from Seniram Publishing, Inc., P.O. Box 432, Glenside, PA 19038.

- 1 July The Cherbourg Peninsula falls as the 9th Infantry Division clears the last resistance from Cap de la Hague.
- 4 July The U.S. generals in command in Normandy decide to uphold the traditional 48-gun Independence Day Salute at noon, but with some minor changes: All 1,100 guns will be pointed at the Germans, and every gun will fire, all timed so the rounds will land at 1200.
- 12 July During the advance to Arno, Italy, Sergeant Roy Harmon's squad is pinned down by three German machinegun nests camouflaged as haystacks. He orders his squad to stay in place as he rushes the nests. Armed with a submachine gun and grenades, he destroys the first and is wounded destroying the second. As he rushes the third, he is wounded again, but continues, crawling on his knees. As he prepares to throw a grenade, he is wounded twice more, the second a mortal wound. As he falls, he releases the grenade and destroys the final machinegun. He saves the rest of his platoon and is posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
- 16 July Soviet forces advance toward East Prussia, capturing the strategically vital rail junctions of Grodno.
- 24 July Rear Admiral H. W. Hill's task force invades Tinian, in the Marianas, as the 2d Marine Division creates an amphibious diversion and the 4th Marine Division slips in the "back door."
- 1 August Myitkyina finally falls, drastically changing British policy from one of avoiding combat in Burma to General Stilwell's preferred tactic of meeting the Japanese head-on.
- 15 August The U.S. 7th Army lands in southern France to drive the defending Germans into the advancing troops of the U.S. 12th Army Group.
- 22 August Iasi, Rumania, collapses as the Soviet Red Army approaches. The next day, the Rumanian king unconditionally surrenders his country.
- 25 August Paris is almost completely surrounded by U.S. troops. French General Leclerc enters the city to accept the Germans' surrender.
- 31 August A U.S. carrier task force begins a three-day bombardment of Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in preparation for invasion.



ANZIO BEACHHEAD

The Allied defense of the Anzio beachhead in Italy in February 1944 was one of the most bitterly contested battles of any war. In terms of the manpower and resources expended, this engagement stands as a testament to the destructiveness of warfare and the herculean effort of vanquished and victor alike. Nowhere in the world had so many men, ships, and machines fought in such a confined space over such unfavorable terrain.

To the ground troops defending the beachhead—veterans

of Tunisia, Sicily, and southern Italy—the fighting assumed a savagery that surpassed that of any other campaign of the Mediterranean theater. Elements of six German divisions attacked along a nine-kilometer front. One small unit Company I, 179th Infantry—lay directly in the path of the German main axis of advance. The company's story, as told by the commander, Captain James H. Cook, Jr., is both tragic and inspiring. (*"The Operations of Company 'I', 179th Infantry (45th Infantry Division) in the Vicinity of the Factory, Anzio*

Beachhead, From 16-18 February 1944," by Major James H. Cook, Jr., Advanced Infantry Officers Course, 1949-1950.)


Few men survived, and many who did spent the rest of the war in prisoner of war camps, but the unit held the line with epic bravery and determination. Removed from the considerations of strategic planning, these soldiers operated far down the chain from general officer decisions. For them, just having a dry hole and enough ammunition to last the night was a luxury. Their story deserves the attention of junior leaders in the Army today for its meaningful, practical lessons and its historical inspiration. (*EDITOR'S NOTE: The 1994 INFANTRY cover cartoons were drawn by Bill Mauldin, himself a veteran of the 45th Infantry Division's Anzio campaign.*)

In the winter of 1943-1944, the Allied forces lay bogged down in the mountains of southern Italy opposite the Gustav Line. Spanning the width of the peninsula, this barrier of obstacles and fortifications lay along natural lines of resistance in the mountainous southern part of the peninsula. The U.S. and British forces that had thrown themselves against it for months now found themselves stalled in a battle of attrition. The campaign needed an invigorating departure from

convention, a bold stroke that would draw off German forces from the line or even force them to withdraw to defensive positions north of Rome. The Allies decided on a flanking amphibious landing 65 miles north of the line at Anzio.

Two divisions assaulted on 22 January 1944, one American and one British, plus some special units employed as regular infantry: Rangers, a regiment plus of U.S. parachute infantry, and a 1,500-man force of Americans and Canadians called the First Special Service Force. The intent, as specified by Allied strategists, was for the troops to move swiftly inland to cut off German supply routes running up and down the western side of the Italian peninsula. The troops waded ashore and met little resistance on the beach, quickly establishing a beachhead 14 miles wide and seven miles deep, but the German Army reacted quickly. Calling up reserves from all over southern Europe and the Balkans, the Germans bottled up the Allies and forced them to revert to defensive operations by 1 February.

A period of stabilization followed and lasted about two weeks. During this time, both sides launched limited attacks and conducted aggressive patrolling operations at battalion level and below. The Allies continued their beachhead supply



Map 1

efforts, and the Germans prepared for their counterattack. The Allies withdrew some units that had been badly depleted in the earliest fighting and replaced them with reserves waiting offshore to exploit a breakthrough.

By 16 February the beachhead line defense consisted of depleted units of the British 1st and 56th Infantry Divisions and the U.S. 3d and 45th Infantry Divisions and parachute infantry, and the 1st Special Service Force. Two combat commands of the U.S. 1st Armored Division stood in reserve.

Captain Cook's company lay opposite the village of Aprilia (Map 1) and its adjacent agricultural processing center. This farmers' clearing house complex, which figured prominently in the entire Anzio campaign, came to be known as "the Factory." Since these masonry and brick buildings provided a sheltered assault position for the German units, they became a pivotal area for both sides during the battle. On the German operations overlay, Company I's positions lay directly in the path of the German axis of advance.

The company was disposed in positions centered to the front of the same houses that lined the road leading into the Factory. Captain Cook dubbed this the "Southwest Road." The 1st Platoon occupied the house and the surrounding ground on the company's left flank and likewise down the line to the right for the 2d and 3d Platoons. The company command post (CP) occupied a fourth house, and the weapons platoon shared a house and surrounding area with 3d Platoon.

In the years before the war, the ground in the vicinity of the beachhead had been reclaimed from coastal marsh land, and the corresponding water table now rose to within inches of the surface. This made the construction and occupation of fighting positions a disease hazard as well as a chore. Each platoon therefore manned its positions with a single squad, while the other two squads rested in the relative shelter of the houses. The German units occupied positions north of the Factory on a line essentially parallel to the Allied beachhead.

At 0600 on 16 February, German rocket and tube artillery fired a monstrous preparation on known and suspected U.S. positions. At 0630 dismounted German infantry made its way into and around Company I's defense. The company had been expecting a major German counterattack for some time, and this heavy cannonade signaled its beginning. Before the shells fell too thickly, though, the soldiers of the off-duty squads ran to their positions, locked and loaded weapons, pulled the safety clips from grenades, and trained their sights on the expected avenues of approach. Cold water that was armpit deep in their holes boosted their already elevated heart rates as the bombardment rolled up to, onto, and then beyond their positions.

At 0630 dismounted enemy infantry advanced from the German assault position in the Factory toward the beachhead line. The battle was joined on a relatively narrow front of about 900 meters. Tanks supported the infantry despite the soft ground and made inroads to positions that provided overwatch for the infantrymen as they assaulted out of the Factory. The fight started badly for Company I and only got worse as the day wore on.

Almost immediately, artillery cut the dual wire system between the company and the units it needed to talk to. Wet conditions in the defense had severely deteriorated the company's radios, making reception spotty. The fire support officer's (FSO's) radio provided the only reliable communications in the company.

Enemy shells landed accurately and heavily among selected targets, and the company suffered immediate losses. Casualties mounted as the assault pressed on. Crew-served weapons such as machineguns and antitank guns drew precise fire, adjusted by the enemy's forward observers. These weapons often had to be dug out of their collapsed positions and remanned wherever possible. The crews that had survived the bombardment were almost certainly wounded and had joined the growing throng of casualties at the platoon aid stations.


At 1200 the FSO was wounded and his functions taken over by Captain Cook. The company executive officer (XO) became a battle fatigue casualty and accompanied the FSO to the rear. Soon afterward, infiltrating enemy units blocked the evacuation route to the rear, capturing some wounded soldiers and their escorts. As a result, the company halted the casualty evacuation, and wounded soldiers began to crowd the platoon and company collection points.

At 1500 artillery destroyed the company's last functioning radio, and runners were now the sole means of communication with the rear, but even this proved largely ineffective. One of two messengers sent to battalion headquarters was felled immediately upon leaving the company CP, and the other disappeared, never to be seen again.

On Company I's left flank, a German tank pulled up to within 25 yards of a house occupied by Company K and pumped three rounds into one of its windows. The survivors promptly came out of the house with hands raised and were quickly evacuated to the German rear as POWs, by way of the Factory. By mid-afternoon, enemy fire had destroyed all the company's machineguns and attached antitank weapons. Hours earlier, the tank destroyers that had been operating in the company sector had quickly expended their ammunition and moved to the rear to rearm. It was clear that the vehicles were unlikely to return in time.

At 1600 Captain Cook observed enemy infantrymen moving around his left flank, and he soon noticed enemy behind his position on the right as well. A runner came up from 2d Platoon and informed him that 1st Platoon had withdrawn without permission along the drainage ditches toward the rear. That left Company I in a tough spot. Captain Cook ordered the runner to return to his platoon and inform the platoon leader that he should hold the company line. This was done, and no enemy penetrated the position.

Just as the company readjusted its defense, the Germans attacked again with a significant concentration of tanks and infantry. Thick mud in front of the company's positions prevented the tanks from maneuvering as intended, and the attack was beaten back, with heavy losses on both sides. As darkness fell, the enemy tanks withdrew, relieving some of the pressure on Company I. Concentrated air and artillery



Map 2

bombardment caused panic in many of the attacking enemy soldiers, and they retired in disorder, also giving Company I some respite.

Under cover of darkness, the company itself withdrew about 100 yards to a shallow ditch to reorganize. The 2d, 3d, and Weapons Platoons were present, as was the company headquarters. This group totaled 60 enlisted men and four officers. Besides the soldiers' individual weapons, the company could field only two Browning automatic rifles (BARs) and two 60mm mortars.

When Captain Cook moved to the battalion CP to report and check on casualties, he found the missing platoon leader with 15 of his soldiers and ordered him to join the rest of the company in the line. Unit strength now stood at 75 enlisted and five officers. Company I spent the rest of the night resupplying themselves, improving their new positions, and routing infiltrators.

The morning of 17 February began with renewed air and artillery shelling at 0740. Three enemy regiments struck the 1st and 3d Battalions, 179th Infantry. Sixty tanks in small groups supported the infantry during the day. (Captain Cook notes bitterly that although friendly armor blamed the soft ground for their failure to support the U.S. infantry, German tanks made life a living hell for the American soldiers dug in along the ditch.)

At 1000 the regimental commander ordered both the 2d and 3d Battalions to withdraw 1,000 yards to the rear to better tie in the regimental line of defense (Map 2). The regiment would establish this new line parallel to Carroceto Creek. The retrograde, which was not well-planned or coordinated, cost many casualties as a result of German fire and lack of cover along the withdrawal route. The 2d Battalion became so disorganized during the retrograde that it could not consolidate along the intended line and ended up another

1,000 yards to the rear, leaving the left flank of Company I exposed once again. Considering this latest development and in light of the heavy casualties they had taken, Company I and the rest of 3d Battalion consolidated into strongpoint positions along the line. Manned by the remnants of each platoon, these formations could not cover all the necessary ground but facilitated control of the company's soldiers; for many of them, only the threat of physical force prevented them from fleeing to the rear.

At 1030 the enemy launched a devastating air attack against the regiment's supply and command and control facilities, one plane targeting the battalion's positions. The bombardment destroyed all electronic communications in the battalion command post and caused tremendous casualties in the headquarters staff. A bomb detonated among the soldiers of Company I, and once again the officers and NCOs had to resort to outright force to prevent wholesale flight.

The attack on the combat and field trains added to the pandemonium, because ammunition was running low in the company area. Enemy fire had destroyed all organic antitank capability in the unit, and without the support of friendly armor the soldiers' only means of discouraging enemy tanks lay in the meager armor-penetrating capability of their rifle-propelled grenades. Runners returning from the trains revealed that few crates of the grenades had survived the attack. Without the prospect of a resupply of these grenades, many soldiers who had retained their composure now lost confidence in their ability to stave off the relentless enemy attacks.

Just as the situation was becoming unbearable and threatening to turn into a rout, all indirect fire assets in the vicinity of the beachhead were brought to bear on the enemy. Although Captain Cook would not find out until much later who called the mission, more than 450 tubes of artillery, every heavy and medium mortar within range, three Allied cruisers, and the fighter bombers of the XII Air Support Command "rained steel and death" down on the German forces. Friendly fire brought in so close to the company's positions transformed the soldiers' distress into an urgency to seek cover below ground and to thank God for the artillery.

Although the soldiers in Company I would scarcely have believed it, the German attackers endured far worse treatment than the Americans. Whole German regiments disappeared in the bombardments delivered by Allied guns and planes. At Anzio, for the first time in the war, heavy bombers flew missions in direct support of Army tactical operations. Two hundred eighty-five B-17s dropping bombs within 3,000 yards of the U.S. perimeter helped the U.S. soldiers realize that the task of defending the Anzio beachhead did not rest entirely on infantry shoulders. The heavy Allied fire broke up the enemy assaults and forced a withdrawal.

The intense enemy action subsided at the end of the day. Company I consolidated and reorganized without a doubt that the Germans were preparing to renew the attack. As darkness fell, Company I began the doubly agonizing task of evacuating the wounded to the rear for the second time since the attack began. Any movement in the vicinity of the front car-



The precise, long-range fires of American artillery—such as this 155mm gun firing at Anzio—disrupted German battle formations and helped relieve pressure on the units holding the fragile beachhead line.

ried the risk of contact with German infiltrators. And the task of carrying litter patients whose terrible wounds and cries of pain—made worse by movement over shell-pocked ground—pushed many soldiers once again to the limits of their sanity. The deep cannon shell holes and thick mud, combined with the sight of trees shredded by the shelling, reminded some veterans of scenes of World War I, which they had survived only to be thrust into this one.

After Company I cleared the wounded, resupplied themselves, and initiated a bare-bones rest plan, the regimental commander ordered a counterattack. The battalions were to regain the ground lost earlier in the day and reestablish themselves along Carroceto Creek, an advance of slightly more than one-half mile.

With Company I in reserve, Companies K and L attacked abreast. Not long after crossing the line of departure, the two companies found themselves surrounded by enemy in a meeting engagement. The Germans, with a superior force of tanks and infantry mounted on half-tracks, killed or wounded a large part of the assault force of both companies and captured most of the rest. The few survivors who made it back to the relative safety of Company I's positions were in shock, some of them crying hysterically as a result of the casualties suffered among their buddies. The soldiers of Company I, many of whom had been in a similar state a few hours earlier, greeted them with sympathy.

Company I advanced to the Leschione Canal to pick up stragglers and meet the expected morning attack. Throughout the night, soldiers came into the perimeter until, a few hours before dawn, the 165 men of the 3d Battalion who were still able formed an active defense. Once again, rumors circulated that 2d Battalion, on the left, had withdrawn. Company I and those who swelled its ranks could hear heavy armored vehicles moving into position a few hundred yards

away. With the left flank once again uncovered, the Germans at first light would enfilade the survivors with tanks and infantry. Captain Cook repeatedly dispatched runners to the regimental command post to advise the commander of the situation and request permission to withdraw. Finally, the order came at 0500, and Company I moved into a reserve position 200 yards behind 1st Battalion and prepared for an all-around defense.

After arriving at the new position and assigning sectors of fire, Captain Cook heard the by-now familiar sound of enemy rockets and cannons. The company dug in, even as incoming rounds landed around it. Four fresh enemy regiments assaulted the 179th Regiment's positions. These enemy troops once again enjoyed the support of a powerful tank force, but U.S. armor also appeared in strength. Their performance on the previous day had been brought to the attention of the division commander, and he ordered them attached to each company instead of operating independently as they had done previously. The division commander threatened an unspecified retaliation if the crews withdrew without permission and ordered that any crew whose vehicle was knocked out would remain in position and fight as infantry. As a result, Company I benefited from improved support from the tank and tank destroyer units on this day.

From the Factory, the enemy advanced under well-controlled combined arms fire up to the Leschione Canal. Because the Americans had blown the bridges, the German tanks could not cross. The German infantrymen left the tanks behind and pressed the attack alone to the 179th's front. Failing to breach the line, they skirted the beachhead line to the east. Repulsed again and again, these German infantrymen continued to attack, after local withdrawals to reorganize, throughout the day.

At 1100 an aerial observer pilot who spotted 2,500 enemy

massing on the Albona Road, close behind the German assault positions, quickly called for and adjusted fire on the formation. More than 220 Allied guns from all over the beachhead responded to the opportunity, engulfing the enemy troops in a maelstrom of fire. The force disintegrated in panic and never made a showing in the Anzio battle. Within 50 minutes, the pilot called four more fire missions onto enemy concentrations. Heavy firepower allowed the Allies to barely hold onto the beachhead. The Germans demonstrated an astounding commitment to offensive success, and on the ground the attacks continued.

By the afternoon of 18 February, Company I lay deployed in a drainage ditch 100 yards behind and parallel to Lateral Road as shown on Map 2. Unit strength stood at 55 enlisted men and three officers. This position represented the one bright spot in an otherwise dismal situation. The walls of the ditch, although only four feet high, gave the soldiers their first dry fighting position in days. Captain Cook combined 1st and 2d Platoons, deployed the mortars 100 yards to the rear, and emplaced the one remaining automatic weapon, a BAR, on the left flank covering a field.

The hospitals in the rear of the beachhead, with space only

for the most severely injured, had sent some of the lightly wounded and battle fatigued soldiers back to the company. Most of these men, however, were not prepared for the shock of returning to combat and arrived without weapons or equipment. Preventing the spread of defeatism and panic required constant vigilance from the officers and NCOs, further taxing the company's already scarce leadership resources.

As the afternoon progressed, enemy attacks became increasingly intense and frequent. Friendly antitank capability dwindled. Most of the regiment's guns lay in twisted heaps along the beachhead line, and U.S. armor had suffered heavy losses. To Cook, it seemed like the beachhead line was about to collapse. The enemy showed signs of launching their heaviest attack yet.


At 1700, 12 German tanks supporting masses of infantry assaulted down the diagonal road nicknamed "Bowling Alley." Not much stood between them and the beach. Only the providence of a destroyed bridge and thick winter mud prevented the Germans from maneuvering around U.S. pockets of resistance. Three hundred *Panzergrenadiers* assaulted out of the woods 200 yards to the front of the 1st Battalion. The Americans, firing madly and calling for artillery, barely stopped the wave 100 yards in front of their positions.

Captain Cook heard the BAR open up on his left. Two hundred yards away, a strong enemy force of about 100 was trying to penetrate between the U.S. 1st Battalion, 179th Infantry, and the British unit on its left. The enemy again threatened to cut Company I off by turning its flank. Without communications, already engaged from the front by a significant force and pinned in place by well-observed artillery, Captain Cook despaired of lasting out the day without becoming a German prisoner. Once again, providence intervened, and a company of British infantry counterattacked out of the Padiglione Woods. In an instant, the situation changed from one of imminent danger to relative safety as the infiltrating enemy were captured and herded to the rear by the British.

Throughout the day the enemy assaulted, counterattacked, withdrew, consolidated, and attacked again. Because the area around the beachhead lacked cover, the attacks moved over the same ground each time. Eventually, tree lines, ditches, and fields leading to U.S. positions were strewn with enemy dead. By 2130 the German infantry and tanks withdrew in a general retrograde that marked the day's first discernible lull.

The 45th Division consolidated and reorganized, and the Allied VI Corps prepared a counterattack force. In the early hours of 19 February, the German infantry and tanks made their last serious threat against the beachhead all along the front. The counterattack force prepared by VI Corps maneuvered on the enemy on the Albano and Diagonal Roads. This relieved the pressure on such dedicated defensive units as the 179th and reestablished some previously held Allied positions (Map 3).

The German attacks continued until 4 March but never again constituted a serious threat to the beachhead line. Both sides conducted local combat patrolling and suffered heavy casualties as a result. On 11 May the Allies broke the stale-



Map 3

mate in Italy by penetrating the Gustav Line near Cassino and breaking out of the Anzio beachhead. Rome fell on 4 June 1944, two days before the Allied invasion at Normandy.

Lessons Learned

Junior officers today can learn many practical lessons from the actions of Company I in defending the Anzio beachhead:

Communications. Communication is the most important sub-mission priority in any situation. The need for coordination on the battlefield demands constant attention to electronic communication facilities and equipment. Although most military electronics we now have are hardened against the effects of weather, they still demand preventive maintenance and careful treatment.

If Company I's radios had been working, Captain Cook may have been able to alert his superiors or adjacent units to the danger of enemy in the battalion's rear. It is imperative that adjacent units inform each other of movements. When 1st Battalion withdrew, leaving Company I's left flank unsecured, it opened the way for the German infantry to flank the company. Obviously, a timely radio transmission might have helped avoid this.

Leadership Under Extreme Stress. Leaders must expect their men to react adversely to the shock of combat. Soldiers display almost incredible acts of courage and sacrifice. They may also suffer psychologically from the horror that surrounds them. Determining which soldiers are more likely to be affected, and their likely reaction, way is often impossible; some may display extremes of behavior during a single day. Leaders must circulate among defensive positions and encourage and console those most in need. Valorous and duty-minded soldiers should be rewarded. Combat fatigue casualties should be treated as far forward as possible and returned quickly to their units.

Responsive Fire Support. Massive and immediate indirect fire can have a far-reaching effect on the enemy. In addition to the local advantage of physically disrupting his formations and facilities, indirect fire has a tremendous negative effect on the enemy's momentum of attack and may be the key to regaining the tactical initiative.

Attachment of Small Units. Small elements or individual weapon crews from other units—like the armored vehicles in this example—should be attached directly to the unit responsible for the defense, down to company and platoon level, if

possible. Not doing so will prevent the most efficient use of firepower and will weaken the overall defense.


Planned Withdrawal Positions. Units should not withdraw without authority. Withdrawal in the defense is a difficult subject to address. If soldiers see a commander emphasize withdrawal, they may withdraw without cause or authority. On the other hand, a well-rehearsed plan using prepared positions makes the work of the defender less confusing and less intimidating when he is hard-pressed. Rehearsals and strictly enforced disengagement criteria are the keys to planned withdrawal. In this case, a planned withdrawal could have prevented the uncovering of the Company I's left flank.

Counterattack. Waiting too long to counterattack can be disastrous. Time favors the unit that holds the ground, whether that is the friendly force or an enemy who has just ejected a defender from his positions. An enemy on the objective, if allowed the opportunity to consolidate unmolested, may establish his own defense so strongly that nothing less than a deliberate attack will dislodge him.


When the men of the 179th Infantry counterattacked late on the night of 17 February, they faced a superior force that had time to consolidate and reorganize, bring up its reserve, and register artillery in their new positions. Against tanks and half-track-mounted machineguns, the exhausted men of the 179th did not stand a chance. In their depleted state, they may have failed anyway, but attacking an enemy before he can consolidate his newly seized ground has a greater prospect for success.

The actions of Company I, 179th Infantry, from 16 to 18 February 1944 illustrate well the tenacity and fighting spirit of both the American soldier and his German adversary. The margin of victory was slim, but in the end the beachhead line was held by a combination of leadership, timely and accurate indirect fires, and stubborn determination. These factors are as important today as they were in World War II, and our leaders must understand them if they are to succeed on the battlefield of tomorrow.

Captain Brian K. Coppersmith recently completed the Infantry Officer Basic Course. He previously served as a rifle platoon leader, a TOW platoon leader, and a rifle company executive officer in the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division. He is a 1989 graduate of the United States Military Academy.



CSS OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA



CAPTAIN STEPHEN MICHAEL

The 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, was alerted on 1 December 1992 and deployed to Somalia two weeks later, in support of the United Nations humanitarian effort in that nation. The immediate reaction company, reinforced with the TOW platoon, had deployed seven days ahead of the main body.

In Somalia, the battalion task force was involved in operations other than war, which included both combat and humanitarian missions. The task force had to be flexible enough to shift rapidly from one mission to another, or to conduct both missions simultaneously. Success required a large, well-coordinated logistic effort and logisticians who were capable of initiative and versatility. As task force S-4, I was responsible for the battalion's logistics planning and execution.

Since the beginning of the civil war in Somalia in 1991, organized government, law and order, and the existing social

structure had been totally destroyed. The Somalis' ability to survive was based on their ability to exert power over one another. Consequently, the local war lords and petty bandits were the ruling force. The Somali people were virtually hostages in their own land. Bandits controlled the distribution of food and other necessities of life, and thousands of Somalis perished from disease, hunger, or violence.

Initially, the mission of the UN force was to provide security and humanitarian aid. Security involved restricting the movement of the bandits, securing the towns, and returning the cities to the control of the elders. In addition, it included securing the ports and clearing and establishing food routes. The humanitarian effort involved getting the food to the people and providing a secure environment in which the humanitarian agencies could operate. The task force was responsible for the 400 square kilometers of the entire lower

Shebelle region, along Somalia's eastern coast.

At the outset, the task force was stationed in Baledogle and for 30 days was the only Army infantry unit in the country. Later the 3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, one of our sister battalions, deployed to Kismayu in southern Somalia.

At Baledogle, our task force was the UN's major force projection unit. Our chief missions were site security, convoy security, and quick reaction. Within the first two weeks, one of our first missions involved securing the Belet Weynen air strip to the north so the Canadians could fly in C130s to establish their base of operations in that sector.

With the arrival of a UN military presence, the bandits went into hiding, with some of their elements pushing farther south and west toward Ethiopia. Our mission then shifted toward bandit interdiction.

In late December, the task force was informed of heavy bandit activity in the major port facility at Marka. Apparently, the bandits had seized the port and were intercepting humanitarian relief supplies. As a result, most of the supplies that came into the city never found their way to the people. Our task force conducted an air assault into Marka, seized the port, and reestablished the flow of humanitarian supplies. The air assault was conducted on 30 December with two companies and a combat service support (CSS) tail on a mission of three to seven days. After we were on the ground and had assessed the situation, it appeared very grave. Marka was a bandit stronghold, one that spread throughout the lower Shebelle region.

Accomplishing the mission in Marka would require a protracted military presence. The task force seized the port and established the "Four Nos": No visible weapons; no technicals (armed Somali vehicles); no Somali road blocks; and no crew-served weapons in the entire area.

With the port under military control, humanitarian supplies were once again able to flow freely to the regional kitchens and humanitarian centers. To facilitate this flow of supplies, we also provided convoy and route security.

As the situation evolved, it became apparent that Marka would be a permanent site for the task force while it was in Somalia. From Marka, the task force could affect the surrounding area and, being centrally located, could also react to changing situations in the north toward Mogadishu and in the south toward Kismayu.

From Marka, the task force area of responsibility extended into the entire lower Shebelle region. To maintain an active presence, units ran continuous missions into the outlying areas. The intelligence we received showed that most of the small villages were under bandit control. Consequently, the task force would conduct cordon and search missions, sweeping through from house to house, enforcing the Four Nos.

In addition, with the help of an attached Special Forces civil affairs team, the task force worked with the villages in setting up a local government and police force. Once stability was achieved at a village, the battalion would move on to other villages and return periodically for a show of force. Twice, it responded to the situation in Kismayu, traveling more than 800 kilometers round trip, to curtail rampant ban-

dit activity and clan fighting.

The battalion remained at Marka, restoring stability and hope for the entire lower Shebelle Region, until it returned home on 15 April, after four months in Somalia.

Accomplishing all of these tasks required flexibility and imagination on the part of the logisticians. Initially, my concerns involved sustaining the force in its two diverse modes of operation—combat and humanitarian assistance. The battalion was simultaneously conducting cordon and searches, raids, ambushes, convoy security, port security, site security, security patrol, and home base support. Moreover, I had to ensure that the unit's supply, medical, and maintenance needs were met. As the mission extended, quality of life for the soldiers became increasingly important.

To support all of this adequately, we operated in many different ways. Initially, we had the combat trains forward and the field trains in the rear with the brigade support area. Later, we used the unit trains concept and, after the area was relatively secure, brought elements of the forward support battalion (FSB) to our location.

Before the Army logistic system (corps support) was fully in place, we coordinated directly with the Marine Corps task force in Mogadishu for all support. To perform the required missions, we had to request certain assets not normally found in a light battalion. Attached to the task force were two reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs) with crews for water supply. We also requested and received additional water and fuel storage assets; two additional truck platoons; dedicated UH-60 Black Hawk logistic support; a chemical platoon for showers; and, on various occasions, an engineer company for construction and quality of life projects.

In Baledogle for the latter half of December 1992, the task force used the unit trains concept. At this stage, all of our support came from the Marines in Mogadishu. The 10th Mountain Division's FSB convoyed to Mogadishu daily for resupply. At times, to spur the system, I organized CSS convoys to establish a relationship with the Marines in Mogadishu.

This period was marked by disorganization. The Marines' logistical systems were not designed to support Army units, and the process was painstakingly slow. Initially, our main concerns were food, water, fuel, and medical supplies. Because of the unsanitary environment, hot food was not authorized, and MREs (meals, ready to eat) were the main issue. In the early stages of our deployment, our water came from Marine ROWPUs, but it was used for personnel hygiene and direct consumption only. Showers were not authorized.

As the battalion field ordering officer, I entered into contracts with local Somalis for manual labor around the base camp and for interpreters. The laborers, supervised by the Command Sergeant Major, helped clean, clear, and improve the battalion area, which freed the soldiers to concentrate on the mission. Interpreters were used to help the maneuver elements in their direct dealings with the Somalis.

No Self Service Supply Center (SSSC) items were available (we had deployed with a 15-day supply); we obtained

JP-4 fuel and motor gasoline (MOGAS) directly through the Marines at Baledogle; full Division Ready Force (DRF-1) combat load at FSB; a 15-day supply of Class VIII, on hand; tires and inner tubes for our high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) became a problem. The only Class IX we had was what we could scrounge.

In early January 1993, I had the combat trains forward at Marka, while the S-4 NCO in charge ran the field trains at Baledogle. To support our operations in Marka, in addition to our internal assets, we deployed with a truck platoon and tank petroleum unit (TPU) from the FSB and two additional

water trailers we had acquired from the Marines.

At Baledogle the S-4 NCOIC coordinated daily with the brigade S-4 and the FSB's support operations officer, passing on my concerns and needs at Marka. The headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commander was forward as a separate maneuver commander with the TOW, mortar, scout, engineer, and air defense artillery platoons task organized under him. Having the HHC commander in this role gave the battalion task force more flexibility in dealing with convoy and convoy security operations. In addition, because of their mobility, the HHC elements were well suited for the cordon



portion of the battalion's cordon and search operations.

At this point, all supplies were being flown in by Black Hawk helicopters, which were also used to evacuate non-mission capable vehicles for third-echelon maintenance at Baledogle. The S-4 NCOIC pushed forward the available supplies on the logistics helicopter once a day and came forward personally once a week.

At this point, we also began convoying independently to Mogadishu to try to establish a direct-support relationship with the Marines. The support we received from them augmented what we received from Baledogle.

We still had no showers, no SSSC, and no Class IV (except for the limited wire and plywood we had brought from Fort Drum). JP-4 and MOGAS were obtained through our convoys to Mogadishu; the unit level logistics system (ULLS) was still not in place; and we still had to scrounge for the Class IX.

During the last two weeks at Marka, our convoys to Mogadishu met with some success, and we were able to get some milk and fruit. The convoys, along with our daily logistics helicopters, allowed us to maintain a green status in our critical classes of supply—I, III, VIII, and IX.

For equipment requiring third-echelon maintenance, the company executive officers (XOs) flew back to the FSB at Baledogle. For vehicle maintenance, we had two options—if the needed part was available, we flew the contact team with the part forward to Marka to do the repairs; when this was not feasible, we sent the vehicle back for repair.

The logistic system still needed a jump start; I had to make numerous trips to Mogadishu, still relying mostly on the Marines. The 548th Army Corps Support was coming on line, but a lot of their assets were still on the way.

My contracting efforts at this stage were aimed at getting interpreters for the battalion and supplies (such as limited amounts of Class IV) that were difficult to get through the system but could be found locally. Interpreters contributed to the battalion effort by enabling the maneuver elements to communicate with the local populace. They were a valuable source of intelligence as well.

I also planned and coordinated logistic support for combat operations in sector, as units now conducted daily separate company and platoon missions geared toward bandit interdiction and convoy and route security. Each separate element that deployed was supplied with a CSS package intended to last for the duration of the mission. A UH-60 was on strip alert for medical evacuation and emergency resupply. The logistic package usually required five-ton trucks to move the unit, water, food, and ammunition. Communication was usually through retransmission or multichannel tactical satellite.

On 30 January the battalion conducted a three-day cordon and search mission on the town of Afgoi. The cordon element, along with the combat trains, moved by ground, while the search elements conducted an air assault. To support this operation, the combat trains split, leaving a small element at Marka and pushing forward its major support. The support platoon leader operated forward, while the HHC XO and the assistant S-4 NCOIC remained at Marka to ensure an open

supply line. Since Afgoi was about 20 kilometers from Mogadishu, we were resupplied directly by corps.

The supply situation was much the same, except for Classes II, V, and VIII. SSSC supply was now critical. Combat load was at the companies and emergency resupply at combat trains. Full DRF-1 combat load was at the FSB in Baledogle. At this point, M203, 60mm, and 81mm illumination rounds were being expended daily, but only a limited amount of small arms ammunition. Class VIII resupply was now available through the medical company at Mogadishu.

Corps support in Marka became operational during February. A captain from the 548th Corps Support made direct contact with me, and we decided to by-pass the FSB at Baledogle and deal directly with corps. This plan was more feasible because of our location some 70 kilometers south of Mogadishu. For two more weeks, we convoyed to Mogadishu for supplies; later, corps began pushing them to us every four days.

Around this time, the Army contractors visited our base camp at Marka. They proposed a plan to attach a civilian contracting firm to our base camp to help us coordinate such key services as laundry and waste and garbage disposal with the local people. We were notified that this plan could be in effect within 30 days.

For the first two weeks in February, most of the battalion was away from Marka, moving through the entire lower Shebelle region, conducting cordon and search missions at all the major cities. Although the battalion was forward, security operations at the Marka port and the surrounding area still had to be maintained.

We supported this operation as we had the January cordon and search of Afgoi, with the field trains still in Baledogle, while the support platoon leader, the HHC XO, and the assistant S-4 NCOIC remained at Marka. The support platoon leader ran the daily logistical package forward and maintained the forward elements. This mission forced us to operate on two fronts, but with careful planning and execution we were successful. We traveled more than 800 kilometers during this operation.

At this point, plans were also being made to improve the quality of life at Marka. A construction company from the 43d Engineer Battalion at Fort Benning was tasked to accomplish this mission. The plan included building latrines around the camp, roofs over the existing buildings on the base camp, an electrical grid with lights, a gravel pit and sanitary facilities for mobile kitchen trailer operations, a running track around the base camp (protected by triple strand concertina), a mess hall, a battalion recreation room, a post exchange, and volleyball courts. In addition to improving the soldiers' quality of life, the intent was to make the base camp suitable for possible handover to allied forces at a later date. These improvements were therefore a high priority, and the resources were made available to the engineers. In addition to engineer construction efforts, a chemical platoon was attached to establish proper shower facilities by the end of the month.

About three days after returning from our two-week mis-

sion in the lower Shebelle region, we were alerted to growing unrest in Kismayu. There were reports of vicious clan fighting and bandit activity. The Belgian and U.S. Army forces in the area were unable to handle the situation and needed reinforcements. To move the entire battalion task force by ground, I requested and received 20 additional M923 trucks with a maintenance contact team. I also received an additional TPU and wrecker from brigade. Within 36 hours after we were alerted, the battalion had moved 400 kilometers and was in Kismayu. By this point, the entire field trains were at Kismayu, with only a small logistic tail, headed by the S-4 NCOIC, remaining at Marka. We deployed with enough supplies for three days, and corps resupply would be pushed straight from Mogadishu.

Over a four-day period, the maneuver elements were involved in fire fights and skirmishes with bandits and rioting clans. The aid station was split to support the maneuver elements. The medics were overwhelmed by the number of wounded Somalis, most of them victims of clan fighting. Seven days later, we made the return trip to Marka. No vehicles were lost during the mission, and when we returned from Kismayu, we were happy to learn that hot showers were finally available.

Since the entire field trains were now once again at Bale-dogle, I asked to have a third-echelon maintenance team with wrecker permanently at Marka. I also requested and received a 20,000-gallon water blivet and a purification unit to support our water requirements. The construction progressed smoothly; it would have been finished except for the lack of supplies in country. The contractor's waste and garbage disposal services were now in place, and the standard interpreters attached to the companies were paid through the contractor. The intent was to reduce the contracting burden on the unit and to provide some additional services.

Some Class IV supplies were available for construction, along with some wire. Class VI sundry packs were available at the rate of one per platoon every 15 days, and even HMMWV tires and tubes were now in the system.

In Marka, from 1 March to 15 April 1993, the system was still unresponsive to certain supplies, such as SSSC. In addition, the battalion commander wanted some recreational and comfort items to improve the soldiers' morale and quality of life. Initially, I requested these items through brigade to division contracting, but received no satisfactory response. Consequently, the battalion commander decided that I should personally travel to Mombasa.

Division policy stated that no individual field ordering officer was authorized to travel outside of Somalia for local purchasing for units in Somalia; a Marine Corps team in Mombasa was to take care of these supplies. Centralized control had its merits, but for the units on the receiving end the system was too slow to be effective.

To bypass this loop, the brigade commander made a personal trip to Mombasa with me and the assistant brigade S-3 to link us up with the Marine team. A week later, we returned with five refrigerators, a 30-day SSSC supply, board games,

footballs, volleyballs, a facsimile (FAX) machine, a video camcorder, and some construction tools. The FAX was needed to expedite communications with higher headquarters, and the camcorder proved invaluable for reconnaissance efforts.

About two days after my return from Kenya, the battalion received a mission to return to Kismayu, where there were new reports of vicious clan fighting and bandit activity. The 3d Battalion, 14th Infantry—the 10th Division unit in Kismayu—had already returned to the United States, and the Belgians were the only forces on the ground.

This time, the main body air-assaulted in, and the CSS elements made the 400-kilometer trip by ground. Once again, with additional military presence, stability was reestablished in Kismayu. Logistically, the operation was handled exactly as it had been the first time—no changes, no major problems. Upon returning from Kismayu, we were glad to hear that the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, would be on the ground in about two weeks to execute property sign-over and a complete relief in place. On 15 April, after four months in Somalia, we returned home.

In Somalia, we had to be flexible enough to shift rapidly from one mode of operation to the other, or to operate in both modes at the same time. Success required a huge, well-coordinated logistic effort and initiative and versatility on the part of the logisticians. The task force was indeed successful, and the following key observations stand out in my mind as a result of that experience:

Future joint training exercises should include and stress logistic involvement between services, which would give us an opportunity to work through some of our compatibility problems while taking full advantage of our similarities. In addition, in deploying an FSB with a light brigade, careful thought needs to go into the number of airframes allocated to the FSB for deployment. The FSB needs to be able to deploy with enough assets to support the brigade immediately. In this particular case, due to the number of available aircraft, most of the FSB's CSS assets deployed by ship.

The ability to enter into contracts and to conduct local purchasing proved invaluable in Somalia. This is a critical asset to S-4s, and in it we have a glimpse of an established system that is worth a great deal.

The use of the HHC commander as a separate maneuver commander proved highly effective. As the battalion S-4, I was opposed to the idea at first, but with an experienced S-4 NCOIC at the field trains, having another separate maneuver commander gave the battalion task force more flexibility in dealing with a constantly changing situation.

Finally, being involved in Operation RESCUE HOPE was a valuable experience for the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry. We were there, and we made a difference.

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TRAINING NOTES



We Need a Peacekeeping MTP

CAPTAIN BLAISE CORNELL-D'ECHERT, JR.

As the sole remaining superpower in a new world order, the United States can expect increasing demands for its help in resolving conflicts and facilitating stability. The U.S. Army expects greater involvement in operations other than war, as reflected by its inclusion of such operations in the latest edition of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. Among these, peace operations may be the most difficult. Although the Army has some experience and some current training doctrine for other missions in this category—foreign internal development, security assistance, humanitarian assistance, and support of insurgency or counterinsurgency operations—it has not practiced peacekeeping and peace enforcement to a major degree since the 19th century, and the rules have changed significantly since then.

Since the Army can expect to perform peace operations for some years to come, we must prepare for them. Unit mission essential task lists (METLs), do not routinely include missions and tasks that support operations other than war, although that may change as units develop contingency plans. Whether these missions are conducted unilaterally, under an existing treaty organization, or with the United Nations, infantrymen must have doctrinal literature to support their unit training. Peace operations

require a high density of infantrymen. We must ensure that our infantry battalions can rapidly deploy to a conflict and execute peacekeeping tasks with the same proficiency as a combat operation.

The Army's primary mission is to prepare to fight and win on the modern battlefield. But we must be just as well prepared to conduct operations at the other end of the spectrum. The problem is that our training managers at battalion level and below do not have the doctri-

"Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."

Dag Hammarskjold

nal support materials they need to assure an adequate level of preparedness for conducting peace operations. What, other than field manuals (FMs), would give our training managers an appropriate training tool?

The accepted norm in establishing a unit training program is the mission training plan (MTP). An MTP is a descriptive, mission-oriented program that helps a unit train on its critical wartime missions. An MTP establishes minimum acceptable standards that apply to all like units in the execution of

tasks associated with missions appropriate to those units. Further, the MTP format is familiar to trainers at all levels, and it aligns the training of the unit with the Army's training and tactical doctrine.

Unit types and tables of organization and equipment, as well as organizational echelons, differentiate most MTPs. In many cases, the tasks associated with particular missions are the same, with sub-task standards that differ only as a function of unit capabilities. In other words, the task *Perform Reconnaissance* in ARTEP 7-10-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Company*, is very similar to the task of the same name in ARTEP 71-1-MTP, *Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team*. The question we must answer is: If we need a peace operations MTP, do we need one for every echelon and every type of organization? Before answering that question, it may be helpful to describe the need for a peacekeeping or peace operations MTP in general.

First, let's examine the operational environment. At the most basic level, an infantry battalion might serve as a contingent element of a UN peacekeeping force. It might serve in a multinational force, possibly under a foreign commander, depending upon an uncer-

tain logistic system and coordinating with numerous governmental and civilian agencies. Additionally, this unit would operate under restrictive rules of engagement (ROEs), while the peacekeeping mandate, the terms of reference (TORs), and the status of forces agreement (SOFA) might severely limit its options.

At a more complex level, a battalion might be part of a U.S.-led joint task force operating with another multinational or UN effort in the same theater. Issues of authority, threat, chain of command, coordination requirements, and force protection would all serve to increase the complexity of the operating environment.

The missions and tasks associated with peace operations do not greatly differ from other, more traditional, tactical missions. Peacekeepers conduct patrols, perform reconnaissance, employ obstacles, secure routes, and defend urban areas. But many of their tasks are not usually associated with infantry operations, and the performance of familiar tasks is often different because of the conditions. Therefore, we cannot expect to depend on current MTPs to adequately prepare our units to perform peacekeeping missions.

As an example, the standards for the *React to Ambush* battle drill require a unit to return fire, use fragmentation or smoke grenades, employ suppressive fire, and assault the ambushing force to destroy it. For a unit in a peacekeeping operation, the principle of use of force in self-defense is implicit, but fragmentation grenades may not be issued because of the ROEs. Suppressive fire or a high volume of return fire may not be appropriate because of a requirement to identify a specific military target—a gunman in a crowd of civilians, for example—before firing, even in self-defense. Given these staggering changes, the quick-reaction drills we have practiced may no longer be valid.

We need to establish a standard of performance that will allow units to perform this and similar tasks without a degree of collateral damage that will impair our mission. Civilian casualties caused by a dependence on the current

training programs may prove fatal, not only for small units but also for the entire peacekeeping operation.

What are some other tasks a unit may face in a peace operation that are not in current MTPs? The following list is a small sample of the many tasks a battalion may perform:

- Disarm belligerents.
- React to news media.
- Evaluate civilian infrastructure.
- Negotiate a belligerent checkpoint.
- Supervise minefield clearance.
- Establish a checkpoint.
- Employ psychological operations (PSYOPs).
- Move dislocated civilians.
- Conduct liaison with local authorities.
- Negotiate.
- Defend a convoy.
- Cordon and search.
- Enforce movement restrictions.
- Identify and process detainees.
- Supervise prisoner exchange.

The performance measures for some of these tasks can be discerned through a review of currently published doctrine. Specifically, FM 7-98, *Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict*, 19 October 1992—available only from the Infantry School—addresses some of these tasks. Branch specific FMs (PSYOPs, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs) are also helpful. Other peacekeeping tasks, however, are completely different from anything we currently do. In almost all cases, it takes a great deal of imagination and extrapolation to come up with an adequate set of performance standards for the tasks on this list. Trainers have neither the time nor the energy to do this, and there is no guarantee that two different units would develop the same standards. Before these units can plan and execute training, the necessary training tool must be available, and the MTP is that tool.

Getting back to the question of whether we need a peace operations MTP for every echelon and type of organization, a battalion is the basic unit used to define commitments for contingent units for UN missions, and is also the most appropriate size to perform many of the anticipated missions in

peace operations or to operate in a particular sector. Similarly, company-sized units will perform most of the tasks in support of those missions. If our primary focus is on preparing for and training to win on the battlefield, we do not want to diffuse that focus with multiple METLs and MTPs for each echelon. An additional consideration is that we want the battalion, as the basic level unit, to have an established standard that is learned, practiced, and applied by all its units.

Ultimately, then, the answer is that we do need an MTP, or MTPs, for peace operations for battalion-sized units, differentiated by the conditions of the operational environment. In other words, we need a peacekeeping MTP and a peace enforcement operations MTP for the infantry battalion. One MTP may suffice because of commonality of tasks and the tendency for each type of operation to include characteristics of the other.

Several positive results would accrue: Infantry battalions would have a mission-based training standard to which they can train. Training plans and evaluations to determine readiness could include missions incorporated into unit METLs for both domestic and overseas contingencies. Units alerted for peace operations would have a readily available reference for conducting realistic and effective training. The staff and training managers of units alerted for movement could then devote their energies to pre-deployment planning instead of exhausting themselves trying to develop an ad hoc training program at the same time. Finally, commanders at higher echelons would not hesitate to recommend the employment of infantry battalions out of a concern about their ability to perform the mission.

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Incentives and Disincentives

COLONEL KARL W. EIKENBERRY

Effective systems of positive and negative reinforcement are vital to the success of any large organization. This is particularly so in the Army where, in time of war, we try to encourage exceptional conduct that may involve risk of life and to deter acts of poor discipline that can lead to the destruction of our forces.

A commander's aim in devising an incentive program is two-fold: First he seeks to recognize worthy achievements of individual soldiers or to correct sub-standard performance. Second, more broadly, he hopes the examples that result will increase the esprit and combat effectiveness of his unit. Because our business is ultimately about the group and not the individual, it is primarily in terms of the latter objective that we should assess the value of any particular motivational tool.

I would like to offer some general principles that leaders should keep in mind when establishing policies for rewards and punishments that contribute to the betterment of an entire organization. Additionally, I will include some specific methods and techniques that officers and noncommissioned officers in a battalion may find useful in realizing that goal.

Incentives

The first and most fundamental question a leader must ask of himself in devising an incentive program is: What are the unit's long-term top priorities? Here, we mean training and tactical proficiency, maintenance readiness, a responsible and competent chain of command, and the like. Since there is a limit to their time and energy, leaders

need to decide what is important and then focus their efforts accordingly. What they choose to recognize as excellence should reflect this emphasis. If the soldiers perceive that leaders put equal emphasis on a wide array of matters, they will be confused.

For example, a great deal of attention is paid to unit reenlistment awards, but commensurate attention may not be paid to identifying accomplishments in training. Certainly, retention merits great emphasis and acknowledgment, but a unit that takes its tactical proficiency seriously will also have high reenlistment rates in due course; and we risk sending the wrong signal when we glorify statistical achievements that may not be directly related to combat readiness. Leaders should periodically look at which acts they reward, with what frequency, and with what emphasis. If the targets are not, by and large, vital indicators of combat readiness, a reassessment is in order.

A leader conveys the right message to subordinates when he concludes important training events or readiness evaluations with award ceremonies. If we want to let our subordinates know what is truly important, we should consider the setting as well as timeliness. Outstanding gunnery skills should therefore be recognized on the range, meritorious performance at the National Training Center while still there, and so on. The battalion commander and command sergeant major (CSM) should present such awards at separate company ceremonies, explaining to all the soldiers the significance of the operation they have just conducted and letting them know that those who are being formally hon-

ored represent the efforts of the entire group.

Such prompt personnel action is possible if commanders take two steps:

First, "generic" citations should be prepared in advance of major exercises, with only the personal data left blank. The citations might read, for example, "for exceptional performance while serving as a member of Task Force 2-62 Armor during NTC Rotation...." The wording should be vague enough to fit any soldier from cook to gunner. Anyone who believes this isn't personal enough should ask himself when he last read the citation on an award he received, and should explain how the S-1 section could produce such a volume of paperwork in so short a time without taking some shortcuts.

Second, award quotas should be allocated by a battalion commander to his companies in advance of major exercises. For example, as part of a combined training center deployment order to a light infantry battalion, I informed each rifle company commander that his unit could receive up to four Army Achievement Medals (AAMs), four Department of the Army certificates of achievement, and four battalion certificates of achievement (corresponding with the rifle company's four elements—three rifle platoons plus company headquarters). Headquarters Company should receive a larger quota consistent with its larger size.

A suspense (usually within a day after the event) was established for the submission of names. All a company commander and his first sergeant had to do was meet with their leaders, work out the details, and submit to the S-1 a hand-

written list of those recommended for specific awards, and the Personnel Administration Center would do the rest.

Given the natural tendency to declare everyone a hero after a demanding exercise, and also to avoid award inflation, everyone should rigidly adhere to the numbers originally prescribed. Furthermore, if we expect the S-1 to meet a tight suspense, we can't handicap him by allowing endless negotiations over quota adjustments.

Medals and certificates do matter when issued with proper discretion. But when a soldier who has already earned the maximum promotion points for awards receives the 14th award of an AAM, we have crossed over to the ridiculous. To avoid devaluing the Army's formal recognition system, battalion commanders should have a tacit understanding with their CSMs and unit commanders on the guidelines that should be followed. (I say *tacit* because such norms must remain somewhat flexible, which is not possible if they are made explicit.) For instance, it may be reasonable to allow an extraordinary soldier to receive, in the course of a three-year tour of duty, a battalion certificate, a Department of the Army certificate, an impact AAM, and an AAM upon his permanent change of station, while an outstanding junior NCO might be recommended for an Army Commendation Medal upon his departure from home station. Awards are ultimately subjective and fair only in the eye of the beholder; while any action intended to rationalize and systematize the award of medals can easily be criticized, commanders and leaders must make some effort to prevent overkill and arbitrariness.

If we restrict our concept of rewards to formal presentations in front of unit formations, however, we forego many powerful ways of motivating units and soldiers. Imaginative officers and NCOs use a variety of instruments as incentives; for instance, writing personal letters to the parents or spouse of a soldier who has distinguished himself, explaining the scope of the accomplishment in terms meaningful to a civilian.

As a battalion commander, I wrote about 30 of these each year to the families of subordinates who had done such exceptional things as completing Ranger School or being a Distinguished Honor Graduate from the Primary Leader Development Course. Feedback from these soldiers and their families consistently indicated increased pride and commitment, on the part of both the soldiers and their families.

No merit badge, if it speaks to core combat skills and proficiency, should be handed out casually. As an example, at the first formation after a company administers the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), any soldier who has scored 290 points or higher should be presented his fitness badge in front of his peers. The same applies to experts at weapon firing, those qualifying for dri-

cal training, the CSM gave me the name of one junior leader or soldier from each company who had distinguished himself in some way—a medic who had just earned the Expert Field Medical Badge, for example—and I would call these soldiers forward individually to lead a pre-arranged exercise, first explaining to the formation their particular accomplishments. Again, I was demonstrating what my priorities were.

Collective incentives can also lead to impressive results. Periodic battalion sports days that culminate in the award of a streamer for the winning company's guidon can be big team-builders when properly managed. Tactical and maintenance competition, on the other hand, can easily degenerate into gamesmanship. The rule is that the more complex and subjective the undertaking, the more wary we should be of devising comparative evaluation schemes that will lead to formal rankings and defeat the purpose of the event.

The most effective unit incentive may be time off. Its perceived value increases to the extent that a unit has a tough training regimen and keeps its soldiers productively employed. Leaders who are too liberal in granting passes will find their subordinates somewhat indifferent to the prospect of a "training holiday." But assuming that time does matter, it can be used as a reward.

The best instance is the "blotter free day." For example, a battalion policy might allow one day off to any company whose soldiers collectively tally 45 consecutive days without a military police blotter report, an off-post incident, or a positive drug test result. To do this, each first sergeant announces his unit's status at morning formation and, when an incident occurs, identifies the individuals involved and the offense that has caused the calendar to return to zero days. Signs are posted in the company areas and orderly rooms with the same information, including the names of the most recent offenders. The blotter-free day (except for critical or resource-intensive training) is then taken, without exception, on Day 46; otherwise the connection between cause and effect is lost.



ver's or mechanic's badges, and the like. To emphasize the badges' significance, the chain of command must require that they be worn on the appropriate uniforms.

Even informal personal memos from superiors can have a noticeable effect on soldiers. When I saw a squad leader training his men, or a young soldier aggressively taking charge during the chaos of a force-on-force exercise, I would make a mental note to write some brief remarks to the soldier through the CSM and the company commander or first sergeant. Beyond expressing admiration for stellar performance, such actions also announce what the organization considers important.

Recognizing a soldier can also be as simple as singling him out in front of his peers. Before monthly battalion physi-

Such a method, religiously enforced, can work wonders. To anyone who might remind me that I said rewards should focus on core combat skills, I say that such a policy does contribute immensely to a shared sense of responsibility for individual actions, central to the maintenance of real discipline in a unit. And more pragmatically, blotter-free days do reduce acts of poor discipline, consequently freeing leaders to concentrate on their essential business.

Small-unit leaders devising an incentives program may find the following list of techniques useful:

Don't reward an individual reward. That is, don't pile medals on top of individual merit badges. For example, the Expert Infantryman's Badge (EIB) is a prestigious award that the recipient is entitled to wear on all his uniforms, and it carries with it valuable promotion points. Leaders who offer AAMs for EIB recipients are indulging in excess, debasing the badge, and probably running their unit totals up through such unwise schemes.

Do reward leaders and the group for outstanding individual performance. Returning to the EIB example, a squad leader who has six of his eight soldiers earn the badge, or a fire team in which all four members earn it, does deserve recognition. Distinguish between individual, leader, and collective incentives.

Use the Public Affairs Office. Soldiers and their families appreciate reading about their successes and watching reports of them on television. Again, however, make sure most of the "big stories" involve hard training, not intramural sports or off-duty education, lest the image become the perceived reality.

Reward the entire team. When recognizing the team, don't forget the slice elements, task force attachments, and combat service support elements. Treat them at least as well as your own soldiers, and your team will quickly coalesce. For example, a task force or team commander should not forget to allocate award quotas to his attachments and slice elements during an off-post exercise. Include everyone in your incentive plan. Anyone who contributes to the

unit's readiness, including family support group leaders, must be given credit, formally or informally.

Use schooling as a reward. Leaders should be liberal in allowing good, qualified soldiers to attend schools. With the promotion points, added skills, time away from the monotony of home base, and associated prestige, access to specialized training is an important—and often emotional—issue within a command. A battalion commander should consider having the schools NCO work directly for the CSM instead of the S-3. The S-3 has bigger fish to fry and often gives short shrift to schools. My own experience was that a sharp sergeant, subordinate to the CSM, who was made responsible for schools—MOS testing, the Basic Skills Education Program, off-duty continuing education—did very well. Furthermore, with the CSM directly running the program, we ensured that winners, not losers, benefited. When losers benefit, cynicism and frustration quickly develop.

Reward leaders. Don't forget to reward leaders; they too are your soldiers. Beyond informal verbal or written praise, it is difficult to find an appropriate forum for formal recognition. One technique is simply to recognize leaders in the quiet of an office in the presence of a small audience (for instance, a battalion commander might present an award to a first sergeant with only his family, the other field-grade officers, the CSM, and the company commander present). This averts the embarrassment that more senior leaders tend to feel in large gatherings, and it allows the presenter of the award to express his gratitude in a much more personal way. Nevertheless, the most substantial form of recognition for a leader is the officer or NCO evaluation report. These must therefore be prepared thoughtfully, meticulously, and accurately. Anything less makes a mockery of professed commitment to junior leaders and can have a negative impact on a soldier's career.

Make significant personnel actions count. Key personnel actions such as promotions and reenlistments should be done in front of unit formations, in dig-

nified settings. Not only do we honor recipients by treating such ceremonies as major events, but we also communicate the right values to the audience and again reinforce our priorities.

Check the barracks to assess the effect of awards. A rule of thumb is that if most of the soldiers living in the barracks have their award citations and certificates displayed, they care about earning them. If few are in sight, this is a reliable indicator that something is seriously wrong with the unit's incentive system.

Disincentives

The Army's disciplinary system is well-codified in rules and regulations, taught extensively in professional development courses to officers and NCOs at every level, and continually scrutinized by the chain of command. Most leaders understand the need to ground unit justice in the concepts of impartiality, fairness, predictability, and timeliness. Most accept that leaders must be held accountable for the actions of their subordinates. Furthermore, most would agree that an effective "deterrence program" uses a full range of disincentives and sanctions to correct marginal or slightly substandard performance before more serious problems arise. Given these tenets as an underlying framework, various strategies for implementation can be devised.

The first requirement for leaders is to develop procedures for staying informed of the various disciplinary actions within the unit. Given the bewildering array of administrative, non-judicial, and legal processes that can be going on in a battalion at any one time—with each separate action involving a unique set of bureaucratic actors, most of whom the commander has little or no control over—it is only prudent to remain "hands on."

At battalion level, a well-proven way to accomplish this is the bi-monthly commander's legal update. Prepared by the S-1, legal clerk, medical platoon leader, and retention NCO (with input from the first sergeants), these sessions are used to review the entire spectrum of ongoing or anticipated adverse person-

nel actions within the unit. These include bad checks and debts and the blotter-free day status of each unit (S-1); letters of reprimand, chapter, and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (legal clerk); overweight program, medical boards, and soldiers on profile (medical platoon leader); and bars to reenlistment (retention NCO).

These sessions should include commanders, the CSM, the first sergeants, an S-2 representative (to keep informed of possible security clearance revocations), the chaplain, the school's NCO (who should chime in if an identified offender is projected to attend the school), and the brigade legal officer. Although such meetings are inevitably time-consuming, they are invaluable. A commander identifies problems that require his attention, a sense of urgency is imparted to all the players, and leaders gain an appreciation of the thresholds for different disciplinary actions in the battalion.

Most leaders are more or less familiar with the range of tools available for enforcing discipline, but attention to detail is absolutely essential in these matters. It is advisable for leaders, down to platoon level at least, to maintain copies of some of the many excellent legal guides distributed throughout the Army (that is, the layman, "cook-book" types). When navigating through this administrative minefield, one cannot afford to lose sight of the basics.

First, make sure the proper mix of instruments is used. For example, a commander may decide to punish a soldier under the provisions of Article 15, UCMJ, for misconduct (and must impose a flag). Beyond this, however, the chain of command may also decide to withhold favorable personnel actions (promotions, schooling, awards) beyond the immediate impact of the Article 15. If the purposes and consequences of such actions are made clear to the soldier through junior leader counseling, the lessons learned will be far stronger than if the Article 15 were administered by itself. The long-term effects of denied access to favorable personnel actions can be more damaging, and knowing this is often an effective deter-

rent to misconduct. And as we have seen, the commander's legal update provides a good opportunity to see that every effort is being made in the cases that require it.

A second fundamental is to use "non-lethal" administrative means to correct poor performance, if at all possible. Despite the effort spent instructing officers and NCOs on the intricacies of the Army disciplinary system we still frequently encounter junior leaders who do not know how to handle a substandard soldier. The laments are common: "What can I do? ... We don't have enough for an Article 15," or "I'll just have to let it go; his career will be over if he goes in front of the old man." But various alternatives are open to leaders,



short of the visit to the company or battalion commander for formal proceedings under UCMJ.

Leaving post and wearing civilian clothes, for example, are privileges that a commander can withdraw. (This should be done in writing; this documentation becomes critical when a soldier violates the directive.) If a commander decides, on the basis of past incidents, that a particular soldier should not be allowed to frequent on-post clubs, he can direct this as well. The removal of privileges, used in moderation, is powerful because of its immediacy, its target (a soldier's free time), its visibility, and its benign nature (causing no black marks in the personnel record). (By "moderation," I mean not withholding privileges either over long periods of time or in conjunction with a UCMJ action for a particular offense, although pass privileges could be removed, pending a quick decision on the disposal of a case.)

Additionally, every commander should have a formal remedial training policy, preferably reviewed and blessed by a Judge Advocate General officer. Care must be taken to see that remedial training is not used as a form of punishment. Still, failure to attain well-defined standards of training and basic soldiering justifies Saturday morning sessions that are specifically intended to correct the identified shortcomings. For instance, a squad leader should have soldiers who routinely fail to complete morning runs, and who score below 60 points on the APFT two-mile run, attend remedial training consisting of jogging and aerobic exercises. Similarly, imaginative junior leaders can develop regimens for soldiers who fail to maintain their vehicles and weapons properly, fall short on MOS proficiency tests, fail to keep up the appearance of their rooms, and so forth. Potentially good soldiers will quickly respond to the extra instruction and the threat to their free time.

On the other hand, a leader who has gone the distance for a subordinate, using his own time to supervise remedial training, has produced a convincing argument to begin separation procedures if the soldier does not adequately respond. Implementing such a program is admittedly difficult. It is sometimes hard to convince junior leaders that spending Saturday mornings working with a substandard soldier will usually solve the problem one way or another (by achievement or elimination), thereby saving months of headaches and distractions. Personally, as a commander, I had only marginal success in gaining acceptance and using remedial training, but the outstanding results in those few instances where it was practiced by aggressive junior leaders convinced me it is effective.

The following are some additional guidelines that unit commanders and their leaders should consider in developing disciplinary systems:

Don't attend to discipline problems during prime time. During the duty day, leaders should be supervising training and maintenance. Officers and NCOs should spend this time with their good soldiers, not a few bad ones. The

moral of the story becomes even clearer to those who change into civilian clothes at the end of the duty day when they see one of their peers, with their chain of command, still in BDUs queued up outside the commander's office. Furthermore, junior leaders themselves tend to become less tolerant of their subordinates' indiscretions as they see their own free time being eroded.

Establish clear procedures for administering Article 15s. Well understood and followed SOPs for administering UCMJ actions save time and reduce errors. Some ideas: The S-1 should attach the flag to the Article 15 (and all adverse actions requiring one, for that matter) as a cross-check for himself and the commander. Most units have the first sergeant or SGM perform the initial reading and explain the punishment (if any) after the fact; this is an excellent technique as it guarantees consensus between the commander and his "top soldier." Choose an appropriate location—if the commander's office is too small, use a classroom or conference room. The commander must ensure (and make clear to the soldier before him) that the process is, first, to determine whether the offense was committed and then to decide upon punishment. Each member of the chain of command present at the proceedings should be required to recommend to the commander the punishment that should be imposed and why; this is excellent training for junior leaders, and it makes them more accountable for the outcome. If extra duty is not tough and visible, it has little value as a deterrent. Post Article 15 results on the bulletin board to get the word out.

Use junior leader counseling records as vital input for adverse action decisions. About the second time a platoon leader or platoon sergeant is told that his commander will not consider his recommendation for the separation of a soldier because the counseling record is inadequate, counseling will improve. Until leaders can show they've done their part in working with their subordinates, the responsibility should still be theirs.

Don't baby-sit or coddle. The con-

verse of the above is, don't allow extended substandard performance. Junior leaders want to believe they can turn around even the most hopeless cases. In one out of every 100, they can; but considering the leader time wasted, these aren't attractive odds from a collective point of view. Ultimately, we are a volunteer force that can ill afford to experiment with social engineering.

Watch for unit trends. In a small unit, multiple incidents of poor discipline in a brief time are almost invariably a sign of poor leadership. Talk with the good soldiers in the group and get to the bottom of it. Hold supervisors accountable, and note on their efficiency reports their inability to maintain order. To the company commander who defensively asks his battalion commander how a squad leader can possibly know if one of his soldiers is going to go AWOL, I would respond, "Would you be able to pick up warning signals from, say, your first sergeant or platoon leaders before he went AWOL?" The answer should obviously be "Yes," and a squad leader must be held to the same standards of responsibility for his own immediate subordinates.

Don't make a physical "profile" an attractive option. If being on profile is perceived as a good deal, the number of "injured" will increase, and morale will drop. Honor profiles, but don't allow the soldiers on profiles to become the "stay-behind" regiment. Only in rare instances is a soldier unable to go to the field and at least pull radio watch; the healing time for these soldiers is usually shorter than for those who remain in garrison. (Peer pressure does have recuperative powers). Additionally, under no circumstances should those who have just completed an extended exercise pull duty while those who have not participated take leave. Elevate the status of those who have done their jobs.

Be aggressive on drug testing. Commanders should fight for every drug screening quota they can get, periodically use dogs, and occasionally check privately owned vehicles. Be utterly random (screen the same company on two consecutive Mondays); tell no one in advance, except the leader who

must pick up the test bottles; and ensure that correct procedures are being followed. As to this latter point, I was once informed by a Criminal Investigation Division agent that a group of soldiers in a particular company was using bleach to foil the test. Although the company commander and I were incredulous, draconian measures were used during the next screening round to guarantee compliance with the rules. The results were four positive tests in a unit that had come up "drug free" for months. Our soldiers come from a society where controlled substances are used casually, and a lot of money can be made in cocaine and marijuana sales. A chain of command that is smugly confident there is no substance abuse problem will one day face a rude awakening.

It is fair to say that the policies that make up a system of incentives and disincentives will vary from unit to unit, according to the style of the commander, the guidance from higher headquarters, and the nature of the mission. In all instances, however, their effectiveness can be measured by several things: the link between rewards and performance that contributes to war-fighting potential; the appropriateness and deterrent effect of punishment; and the degree to which the system strengthens cohesion. Most of this discussion aims at meeting these criteria. Leaders who work hard to ensure that their use of rewards and corrective action is primarily directed at building combat readiness will probably lead well-trained and well-disciplined units.

Colonel Karl W. Eikenberry is assigned to the DA staff. He commanded a light infantry battalion in the 10th Mountain Division and has served in command and staff positions in airborne, Ranger, and mechanized units in the United States, Korea, and Europe. He also served as an assistant Army attache at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, holds a master's degree from Harvard University, and is now completing a doctorate at Stanford University.

Cordon and Search

LIEUTENANT JAMES SISEMORE

The attention of the Army in recent years has focused more and more on the techniques of operations other than war, in which both belligerent and non-belligerent civilians play a major role. One technique that is useful in such situations is the cordon and search.

During Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989, U.S. forces were called upon to conduct more than 150 searches of villages and townships, looking for escaped elements of the Panamanian Defense Force. The staff of the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC) in Panama has since incorporated a village cordon and search as one of its training scenarios.

The staff at the JOTC defines the cordon and search as a "populace and resource control operation conducted to isolate a specific area and search personnel, buildings, and terrain. It usually involves civilian agencies and both U.S. and Joint Forces." In the scenario the JOTC uses, the village being searched is not considered hostile, and no enemy forces are expected to be present. The village is considered friendly, and every precaution has to be taken to ensure that the villagers are not mistreated or driven into sympathy with the enemy by unnecessary actions. If enemy troops were known to be present, the plan of attack would be modified to meet a different threat. Whatever the scenario, however, force protection has to be the top priority. Each soldier needs to be briefed on what he must do if he encounters enemy soldiers.

A cordon and search can be used in a variety of light infantry missions. In today's operating environment, the use of brute force to gain entrance to a town

or village and to search it is seldom, if ever, authorized.

The goals of a cordon and search mission are varied—the separation of the enemy from his support bases, the capture or destruction of enemy personnel and equipment, or the collection of intelligence on enemy activities in the area. The mission may also be to liberate civilians who have been forced to live under enemy influence or control.

Friendly forces may also institute cordon and search operations to demonstrate host nation legitimacy to the populace by introducing representatives from that nation into the village or sector. The efforts to gain the trust and confidence of the indigenous personnel can be expanded through the introduction of food, medicines, and other conveniences into the village.

Organization

The organization of a cordon and search force may vary in size and composition, but the three primary elements are *security*, *search*, and *reserve*. The security and reserve elements can be designated from a standard light infantry rifle company, but the search element may need additional assets from other units.

Depending on the size of the objective, the search element should have at least an infantry platoon attached, but other branch elements should also be dedicated:

- Military intelligence units in the form of translators and interrogation teams should be allocated.
- Military police with scout dogs can be used to identify possible tunnels and escape routes. Military police can also

be assigned to conduct the individual searches of personnel (with female MPs to search female civilians when needed). Additional military police could be assigned to guard and secure confirmed and suspected enemy personnel after interrogations are completed.

- Engineers may be needed to enter certain structures and destroy any enemy equipment that may be found there.

Civilian personnel may also be assigned to the search element or brought in after the village has been secured. Government intelligence and counter-narcotic agencies, depending on the area, may have an interest in the village. International Red Cross, religious groups, or medical personnel may also be useful in gaining popular support and useful information as well.

One group that should not be left out of this type of operation is representatives from the host nation itself. Whether these people are host nation police or representatives of religious groups, they can be useful in offering either comfort to the villagers or assistance in controlling them.

The Cordon

The first step in this operation is, of course, to establish a cordon, and the commander needs to make sure he has enough soldiers before he begins the operation. He makes this decision on the basis of intelligence that is either given to him or that comes from internal reconnaissance performed by his unit.

The following are important considerations for the commander:

- The size and layout of the town or village.

- Tunnels and roads into or out of the town or village.
- Fortifications in or near the area.
- An exact or estimated population count.
- All avenues of approach into the village.
- Suggested routes to the objective area.
- Any enemy activity in the area of operation.
- The intelligence requirements of the commander's superiors.

The commander can then decide upon the best way to seal off or cordon the objective. Several options are open to the cordon forces:

To seal off the entire objective, he can use either a single security force or a double cordon. The single cordon is the easiest to emplace, but it does not offer the same security as the double cordon, which consists of an interior and an exterior security force. The interior cordon seals off the objective to prevent anyone from leaving, while the exterior cordon keeps any new enemy forces from entering the objective once the search has begun.

The use of stealth in the emplacement of the cordon is essential to a successful mission. The interior cordon, which is the critical force, must completely surround the objective area without being compromised. The exterior cordon does not have to surround the objective completely (which may not be possible in any case), but it does have to be able to establish roadblocks and checkpoints along likely avenues of approach into the objective area.

The outer cordon does not have to be accomplished by infantry forces; it can be conducted by military police who are trained for that mission. The best time to establish a cordon is during hours of limited visibility. The cordon force must be in place before a successful search of the objective can begin.

The Search

The search of the objective, whenever possible, should be done in the light of day. A plan needs to be established and then rehearsed by the elements



These 25th Infantry Division soldiers, conducting a cordon and search operation near Cu Chi, Republic of Vietnam, provide security while search elements clear a village

involved. The key leaders of the search teams, at least, should conduct a rehearsal of the search plan. The unit as a whole should enter the village through a single point in the interior cordon. The entering force needs to be prepared to conduct a search by force in case it meets any resistance.

The search plan should be simple and should include both personnel and buildings. It is still important, however, to consider the village friendly during the operation.

Every soldier must understand that the intent of the mission is to rid the area of subversives and not to cause the villagers to join the enemy by choice. The villagers must be treated with the respect desired by the host nation. Every effort must be made to reduce the inconvenience of the search and not to insult the inhabitants of the village in any way. If possible, each search element should have an interpreter to inform the inhabitants of the intentions of the search.

The force has several possible search options upon entering the village. One is for the inhabitants to be rounded up in a central holding area and taken away one by one to be interrogated while a simultaneous search of the village is being conducted. This plan eases the

problem of controlling the civilians and is the easiest way to conduct the search. It does not, however, allow the searcher to identify the person being searched with his house, which is also being searched. If something is found in a certain house, no link to an individual can be made.

A second option is to force each civilian to remain in his or her house. This plan calls for every house to have an assigned guard when the force enters the village. The search of each house can then be carried out separately in the presence of the occupant.

Each villager should be allowed the right to observe his house being searched, with an interpreter explaining exactly what is going on and why. It can also be useful to observe a person's reactions, which may give away the location of important items or information. When the search of a house is completed, each person or family can be led to a central holding area to be questioned. The problem with this plan is having enough personnel to guard each house as the search goes on. Interpreters are essential during this period. Otherwise, junior soldiers may have trouble containing hostile personnel in a particular house.

A way to solve many of the possible

problems is to enter the village before first light when most of the people are still in their homes. Once the forces are in the village, interpreters can use a megaphone (from an attached psychological operations team) to call for the inhabitants to leave their houses. The houses and the people are then marked with engineer tape, and the people are led to a central holding area where the plan of searches and interrogations can be explained to the group as a whole. As each house is about to be searched, the occupant can be brought up to observe the search as well as to be observed. At the same time, an interpreter should explain what is happening. Upon completion of the search, the villagers can then be interrogated and segregated into friendly and hostile groups.

These interrogations should be conducted in separate buildings, not in view of the holding area. After questioning, each person should be placed in a separate holding area, again out of view of the initial area. Here, medical aid as well as a hot meal can be offered.

When the interrogations and searches are completed, those suspected of illegal

acts should be evacuated before the rest are released. When this is completed, a final briefing should be conducted by the commander of the search element (through an interpreter, if necessary), or by a host nation representative to the villagers. All actions should once again be explained, along with the reasons for the search.

The reserve force may or may not play a large role in the mission. It serves as a reaction force in case of trouble inside or outside the village. The reserve can help the search element secure the villagers, or it can be released to assist the cordon element.

The keys to the success of a cordon and search operation are much the same as in any other mission, including a thorough mission analysis, proper task organization, strict control measures (inside and outside the objective), good intelligence, precise timing, and rehearsals. Contingency plans have to be carefully considered and prepared. Things that may help a unit convince the civilians include candy, cigarettes, hot food, medical aid, and host nation representatives.

Again, if the mission is to succeed, the inhabitants of the village must be treated with dignity and respect. Religious considerations must be honored; for example, churches and cemeteries should not be damaged or searched without good reason.

The cordon and search mission can go hand in hand with peacekeeping operations or noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). In today's world, this type of mission is not unusual for a light infantry unit, and the need for such a mission may be just around the corner. Commanders need to be well-briefed by their S-2s on the traditions and beliefs of the area and must have a solid, well-rehearsed plan before they attempt such a mission.

Lieutenant James Sisemore is S-1 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division. He previously served as a rifle platoon leader and deployed to the JOTC with the regiment. He is a 1990 ROTC graduate of Southwest Missouri State University, from which he also holds a master's degree.

Company Reconnaissance

CAPTAIN JOHN K. CAROTHERS

I agree with Captain Kevin Dougherty's article, "Leaders Reconnaissance," in INFANTRY's September-October 1993 issue (pages 12-14). Sending the company leaders on a reconnaissance can be detrimental to a mission, and it takes time the leaders could better use in planning and supervision. Still, company level reconnaissance must be done.

Lessons learned from combat operations and training exercises have shown that company leaders often neglect

reconnaissance. The battalion scouts do an adequate job of providing the battalion commander the information necessary to assess his plan, but they do little to help the company commander. Just linking up with the battalion scouts is a tough mission, and I have never believed a battalion scout who points into the darkness and says, "It's right over there, sir." A well-run reconnaissance can confirm or deny the commander's tentative plan. (Yes, the com-

mander should already have a plan before he starts his reconnaissance and then use that plan to guide his reconnaissance effort.)

After serving as an observer-controller for the 7th Infantry Division's Bold Thrust program, and observing our own battalion at the Joint Readiness Training Center, I actually began to think that "movement to daylight, then fire and maneuver" was an actual form of maneuver. As I approached company

TRAINING NOTES

command, I wanted to figure out how to avoid this popular but non-doctrinal form of maneuver.

Thinking back to Ranger School, I could hear the principles of patrolling—reconnaissance, security, planning, and control—still ringing in my ears. I felt secure about planning and control, but the keys to force protection and mission accomplishment lay in reconnaissance and security.

The following is a technique that I have used and can recommend to those of you who command light infantry companies:

Task organize the company's organic 13-man, three-team antiarmor section into a scout section. This organization adds depth and flexibility to battalion operations by freeing the battalion scouts from the task of conducting reconnaissance for the companies. This added depth will help the battalion fill the gap between division reconnaissance and the current battalion reconnaissance area of operations. While this scout organization's main effort is reconnaissance, it retains its role as the company antiarmor asset. If it is organized as described, I believe the company will be better able to fight tanks.

An alternative is to designate a squad in the company or in each platoon to receive additional training on reconnaissance. I have seen this technique used successfully in several units. You may argue that *all* infantry squads should have reconnaissance skills, and if this is the only way you can organize for reconnaissance, fine. But I found drawbacks to this course of action: Most important, I did not want to take the combat power that a squad represented away from my platoon leaders. And I was not sure the average squad and its individual members could accomplish the difficult missions I would give them. Providing additional training for a single squad out of a platoon is harder than it is for a separate element, because the rifle squads have too many other tasks to train on.

My philosophy on light infantry fighting armor also differs from that of some authors. The antiarmor section was designed to fight tanks with the Dragon,

but the Dragon cannot effectively fight a tank. If I am operating in an area where tanks are also operating, I am probably not being employed properly. In the terrain where light infantry should be operating, the most probable threat will be personnel carriers or armored cars, and the AT4 light antiarmor weapon can destroy these.

In short, I did not, in most cases, see myself using Dragons against tanks, and this mission analysis helped me make the decision to use my antiarmor section for reconnaissance. When the company is fighting armor, the antiarmor section will revert to that role, and a squad from one of the platoons will be used for reconnaissance.

The scouts must all volunteer for the unit. The company commander and the



first sergeant must interview and carefully select the best of the company's soldiers. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants may not like the idea of the commander taking the best soldiers out of their platoons, but the first time their line soldiers walk straight into an objective rally point (ORP) without benefit of a map check and flow right through the assault position into the objective, they will appreciate the need for the best scouts we can train.

Scouts should also be held to stan-

dards above the Army standard. A score of 180 on the Army Physical Fitness Test will not get him through a 20-kilometer infiltration, and the section's four NCOs should be Ranger qualified. The dividends this unit will pay are well worth any negative results from building an elite element in the company.

In airborne and air assault organizations, most units have their antiarmor assets in the platoons in the form of a weapons squad. This squad consists of a staff sergeant who has four soldiers who operate the M60 and M249 machineguns and four who operate the Dragons. I recommend that commanders of these units organize as light infantry does. One day soon, these units should have the Javelin—a more effective antitank weapon. With this system and its range, it will be too much of a task for the weapons squad leader to train, employ, and control both the antiarmor and machinegun assets in the platoon. If you're fighting tanks, you will probably want your antiarmor assets under company control anyway. (I believe that the weapons squad is one of the basic reasons it is difficult to find a machinegunner who understands the art and science of machinegunnery.) Have the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants handle machinegun training and employment. Switching to the light infantry antiarmor section organization will give you a much needed reconnaissance asset and also improve your company's ability to fight tanks.

The executive officer (XO) should lead the reconnaissance section in most cases. I would still require that he and the first sergeant plan and coordinate logistics, but the supply sergeant should execute the plan. In an armor fight, the XO will also command and control the section.

The scout organization can help the company in many other operations:

Designated Marksmen. Combat marksmanship, in my opinion is in terrible shape in most units. (Shooting expert on a qualification range is a far cry from combat marksmanship.) As a company commander, you need soldiers who can shoot and, more important, soldiers who can shoot and are willing to

engage an enemy. Find out who is running a range the next day, and you will probably be able to slide one or two of your soldiers in on his ranges. Get your scout marksmen on a known-distance range two or three times a week, and make them experts with the AN/PVS-4 night sight. They will do miracles for you in operations other than war. A head shot at 100 meters will be great, but center of mass will do. Remember, too, that he will be shooting from behind you while you're talking to some potentially bad guy on a city street.

Air Assault Operations. Use your scouts in the control of helicopters and in setting up pick-up zones. Link them up with the lift and attack unit on post, and get the scouts involved in its training. You may have noticed helicopters flying around at night with no troops in them and no troops on the ground talking to them, and you can help fix this to improve the training of both.

Engineer Operations. How much demolition does it take to blow a door off its hinges or a man-sized hole in a cinder-block wall? How do you make booby traps, put on and take off a mine's anti-handling devices, or construct a double-apron fence? You're not going to get engineers all the time, and your infantrymen need to know how to conduct engineer operations. This training will pay big dividends, especially in your next urban battle. A fellow commander from the engineer battalion who has his soldiers going out the next day to blow demolitions and cut some steel probably won't mind having two or three of your scouts join this training. It usually turns out to be old hat to the sappers, and they will love to show off and instruct your scouts on the use of demolitions. Don't miss these opportunities because of training schedule lock-in rules.

Linguist. Poll your company for language proficiency, and you may be surprised what language skills the soldiers have. Street talk is a language your soldiers may need to know in future operations. Give your scouts some language tapes. A couple of key phrases in several foreign languages may come in handy. Encourage your linguists to enroll in advanced language courses. In

operations other than war, human intelligence is critical, and your linguists will get you the HUMINT you need.

Quartering Party Functions. Use your scouts like the mechanized infantrymen use quartering parties. Kick them out early to help in occupying ORPs, link-up points, and assembly areas.

Security Operations. Your scouts can be armed more heavily and used to conduct counter-reconnaissance or security operations. Many company commanders leave security operations to the battalion in the defense, but this is a big mistake. Use your scouts to kill the enemy reconnaissance and to provide observation of the enemy before he enters your engagement area or sector.

Pathfinder Operations. On many occasions, air assaults are costly undertakings, as I have observed on many landing zones (LZs). As a company commander on company air assaults at night, I had little control over the situation for at least 45 seconds after the helicopters deposited us and departed. With 22 or more combat-loaded soldiers packed into a Black Hawk screaming into an LZ with only six seconds to get off the helicopter, things get confusing. Add to that some incoming small arms and indirect fires, and things really get tense.

The idea is to insert your scout section and XO anywhere from several hours to a day early to secure and mark the LZ. In this mission, the scouts will go heavily armed with M249 machine-guns, M203 grenade launchers, and M4 carbines with AN/PVS-4 sights. Instead of going into an LZ where helicopters are expected, the scouts will insert by fast rope in an area away from the LZ. Their task is to conduct an area reconnaissance of the LZ area. Depending on METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time), they will either destroy, fix, suppress, or report on the enemy in the LZ area.

When the scouts establish communications with the company or battalion, they must be able to talk to and control attack helicopters, close air support, and indirect fires. Just two enemy soldiers with radio and rocket-propelled grenades can ruin your day when you're

on the final approach into an LZ.

Send your scouts over to the long-range surveillance detachment to receive training on tactical satellite communications equipment for long-range communications. For short-range communications, four AN/PRC-126 squad radios and a couple of AN/PRC-77s will do. Your scouts must be expert in field expedient antennas.

Navigation Assistance. Use your scouts to recon and mark routes and guide the company; kick them out early to find the best route to the objective. Use your imagination on how to mark the route, such as infrared chemical lights, fishing line, and the like.

The typical scenario for an attack is receive the mission, do a quick estimate, make a tentative plan, and send the scouts to the objective area under the command of the XO. (They should travel light; METT-T, not unit SOP, should determine uniform. Work with your boss on getting rid of unnecessary gear.) The unit moves to the objective area and conducts the area reconnaissance, pinpoints the objective, and conducts reconnaissance in accordance with the commander's tentative plan. One team will remain at the objective and provide surveillance; the two remaining teams move to the company ORP, and one team establishes the ORP (sand table, platoon deployment) and the other moves back to the company and guides the company to the ORP. After the fragmentary order, the scouts help the unit get to the support by fire, security, assault, and breach locations.

I have offered here a technique for doing reconnaissance and some ideas on how to use your scouts. If you use your imagination, these soldiers can be an asset in many situations. A key point to remember is that they will be taking care of you and your company, so take good care of them.

Captain John K. Carothers is a small group instructor for the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. He previously served as company commander, MOUT instructor, air assault school commandant, and Bold Thrust observer controller in the 7th Infantry Division. He is a 1983 ROTC graduate of James Madison University.

OFFICERS CAREER NOTES



CONTACTING INFANTRY BRANCH

Most of the officers calling Infantry Branch at the Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) first reach the Voice Mail system and are asked to leave a message. Seldom do they actually talk to someone on the first try, and this is a source of irritation to many officers in the field. Still, this system and others—E-Mail, PROFS, TOPMIS Mail, the U.S. Mail, and FAX—are the best possible means of communication with assignment managers.

The high volume of telephone traffic to and from Infantry Branch dictates the use of alternative ways of communicating with assignment managers. Written communications are more definitive and permanent and help us retain records of your needs and desires. Fax and E-Mail messages also give us something concrete to work with, and give you a means of rapid communication. So help us help you by sending your time-sensitive communications by FAX or E-Mail. But don't give up on the telephone; just try to give us a little more time to call you back.

The accompanying directory provides information on several paths you can take in your attempt to communicate with Infantry Branch and other agencies at PERSCOM.

ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS ACCESSION BOARD (FY 1995)

The PERSCOM Army Acquisition Corps Accession Board for officers in Year Group 1987 is currently scheduled to convene on 3 October 1994. Volunteer infantry officers from that year group will compete for approximately 20 to 25 positions. Officers from other year groups may also apply for accession, but they will compete on a case-

by-case basis for their year groups' available positions.

To be competitive, an officer should meet the following prerequisites:

- Have a baccalaureate degree. (A

degree in business, management, science, engineering, and other technical fields is recommended but not required.)

- Have college transcripts and Graduate Record Examination (GRE) or

INFANTRY BRANCH DIRECTORY

DSN 221-XXXX
Commercial (703) 325-XXXX

POSITION	NAME	EXTENSION	USERID
Branch Chief	LTC Jon Laurich	0445	LAURICHJ
Branch XO	MAJ Rick Megahan Ms. Delores Hairston	4376 0445	MEGAHANR HAIRSTOD
LTCs Desk	MAJ Rick Megahan MAJ Brian Baldy	4376 5524	MEGAHANR BALDYB
MAJs Desk	MAJ Mike Norton MAJ Steve Gonzales Mrs. Phyllis Harley	5522 5521 5511	NORTONM GONZALES HARLEYP
CPTs Desk	CPT Vince Bryant CPT Marlon Blocker Mr. Jawanza Harmon	5520 5596 5518	BRYANTV BLOCKERM HARMONJ
IOAC/LTs Desk	CPT Mark Erwin CPT Gwen Hughes	5515 5513	ERWINM HUGHESG
Future Readiness	CPT Barry Farquhar SPC Pelleymounter	5517 6703	FARQUHAB PELLEYMS
Infantry COLs	MAJ Mike Colpo	7866	COLPOM
VOICE MAIL		0207	
FAX		5463	

E-MAIL: userid@HOFFMAN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL

PROFS: [AEDDC1A\(userid\)](mailto:AEDDC1A(userid))

FUNCTIONAL AREA ASSIGNMENT OFFICERS:

FA 48C,E	3132
FA 48B,F,H	3134
FA 46, 47	3123
FA 49	3113
FA 48D,I,J	3133
FA 39, 50, 54	3115
FA 45, 41	3112
FA 53	2800

BRANCH ADDRESS:

CDR, PERSCOM
ATTN: TAPC-OPE-I
200 Stovall St.
Alexandria, VA 22332-0414

TO ORDER FICHE/ORB:

CDR, PERSCOM
ATTN: TAPC-MSR-S
200 Stovall St.
Alexandria, VA 22332
DSN 221-9612

Graduate Management Admissions Test (GMAT) scores less than five years old. (GMAT score must be 500 or more; GRE scores must be above 500 in all areas.)

- Be branch qualified as a captain (highly recommended).

- Be a graduate of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3).

- Have a current official photograph.

The following additional requirements apply to earlier year groups:

- For YG 1984 and earlier, have a master's degree.

- For YG 1979 and earlier, be branch qualified as a major and be at military education level (MEL) 4.

To volunteer, an officer should submit a memorandum requesting consideration—along with copies of college transcripts, GRE-GMAT scores (if available), and any other correspondence—directly to Infantry Branch for consideration and submission to the board. Applications must be received at Infantry Branch by 12 September 1994 to be considered.

It is highly recommended that an applicant review and update his Official Personnel Management File and Officer Record Brief before the board's convening date and submit a new official DA color photo with his application.

Additional information is available from CPT Barry Farquhar at DSN 221-5517, commercial (703) 325-5517; or MAJ Mike Delaney at DSN 221-6354, commercial (703) 325-6354.

COMPANY COMMAND OPPORTUNITIES

Captains who have not had an opportunity to command will be assigned to organizations that provide this opportunity. Infantry officers can command in a variety of units, including infantry, headquarters, training, and school organizations.

Second commands are limited to selected heavy battalion headquarters companies, division headquarters companies, and long range surveillance

units. Other types of second commands are handled on a case-by-case basis and may be supported if endorsed by the chain of command, provided it does not require an officer to remain on station beyond 30 months.

Generally, the total time in command for those who receive this opportunity averages 24 months—12 months in command of a line company plus 12 months in command of a second company.

CAS3 REQUIRED FOR USAR PROMOTION TO MAJOR

On 1 October 1994, completion of CAS3 will become a requirement for promotion to major in the U.S. Army Reserve.

The new Reserve Component Officer Education System (RC-OES) prerequisites for promotion will affect the attendance of Active Guard Reserve (AGR) soldiers at the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). This means that all captains with dates of rank after 16 May 1988 will be required to complete CAS3.

These changes will be spelled out in Army Regulation 135-155, *Promotion of Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers other than General Officers*.

AGR captains with dates of rank after 30 September 1987 are now ineligible to enroll in CGSOC without CAS3.

The Full Time Support Management Center in St. Louis receives a quarterly report directly from the School of Corresponding Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, listing the names of AGR officers enrolled in CAS3. From this report, the Officer Management Directorate identifies officers who are eligible for but not enrolled in CAS3, and those who terminated participation before completing the correspondence portion of the course.

After these reports are analyzed, officers are sent letters directing their enrollment or selection of a class date for CAS3, Phase II. Before selecting class dates for Phase II, officers should first coordinate their attendance with

their commanders or supervisors.

The Officer Management Division will help accommodate an officer's unit mission requirements and preferred class dates. Questions on attendance should be directed to DSN 693-9513 or commercial (314) 263-9513/9517.

USAR LINGUIST UNIT SEEKS NEW MEMBERS

The 1st U.S. Army Reserve Linguist Unit continues to recruit soldiers who are interested in practicing their language skills and improving their proficiency.

The unit is a non-pay reinforcement training unit (RTU) whose soldiers drill for retirement points. Although a subordinate unit of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, it provides soldier linguists to support the operational needs of the Total Army.

The unit, headquartered in Washington, D.C., monitors the activities of all its soldiers. Subordinate detachments are operating in San Diego, California; Houston, Texas; Tampa, Florida; Detroit, Michigan; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; New York, New York; and Charlottesville, Virginia.

Additional information is available from 1st USAR Linguist Unit, ATTN: S-1 (Attachment), 6601 Baltimore Avenue, Riverdale, MD 20737-1025; or (202) 736-9055.

RESERVE COMPONENT PCC REQUIREMENTS CHANGE

A recent change to the waiver authority for attending branch precommand courses (PCCs) requires that all prospective battalion and brigade commanders in the U.S. Army Reserve be branch-specific PCC qualified before assuming command. The change became effective 1 May 1994.

When circumstances require a waiver, the request must be forwarded to the Chief, Army Reserve, ATTN: DAAR-OP, and the final approval authority is

the Chief of Staff of the Army.

This change is one initiative of the Reserve Component Leader Development Action Plan (RC-LDAP) aimed at improving readiness and the leadership climate in the U.S. Army.

The point of contact is Mary Ellen McCrillis at DSN 226-6173, or commercial (703) 696-6173.

EDUCATION REQUIRED FOR RC WO PROMOTION

Military education requirements for upcoming Army Reserve vacancy boards and the 1994 centralized CW3/4/5 mandatory selection boards

have been modified.

Completion of the Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) or equivalent is required for selection in military occupational specialties (MOS) for which a WOAC-RC is available.

Failure to be selected because mandatory military education has not been completed will result in a "passover," with two passovers being grounds for separation under Title 10, U.S. Code.

Completion of the Senior Warrant Officer Course or the Warrant Officer Senior Course will substitute for completion of WOAC.

In cases where no WOAC is available, or where none exists for a warrant officer's MOS, WOAC will not be

required. Instead, the warrant officer must take the new Warrant Officer Staff Course before "pin-on" of the new rank and "effective date" pay. The MOSS that fall into this category are 130A, 131A, 132A, 140B, 140D, 140E, 180A, 215D, 311A, 640A, 670A, 880A, 881A, 918A and 921A.

Since this situation is likely to worsen as a result of the drawdown—decreasing the density of many warrant officer MOSS—the Warrant Officer Career Center is researching the feasibility of creating a generic (without regard to branch or MOS) common core WOAC to fill the gap. If this course is established, it will become a requirement for promotion.

SWAP SHOP



SAVE THOSE OLD BOOTS WITH NEW LACING TECHNIQUE


Compared to today's high-tech speed-lace boots, the older boots with eyelets for cross-lacing look antiquated; more important, they take longer to put on and take off. But don't throw them out. Instead, use the Israeli Defense Force's paratrooper boot-lacing technique:

Take a 54-inch length of 550 parachute cord (you can get it in black for uniform appearance), fuse the ends with heat, and tie a large knot at one end. Starting at the bottom eyelets, insert cord from inside of right eyelet 1. Thread to left eyelet 1, forming a side loop. Run cord straight up from the inside to left eyelet 2, forming an up loop. Repeat the process, alternating up loops and side loops as shown.

Tighten by pulling on the bottom side loop and working your way up to the top. You'll find the side loops easy to grab and tighten with one hand. (With regular lacing, you have to pull each cross lace carefully with both hands.) At the top, run the cord through both eyelets twice, and stuff excess cord into the boot top. The lace will be secure and will not come undone during strenuous movement.

If your boots don't have an ankle-flex cut-out, skip eyelet 5 by up-looping from eyelet 4 to eyelet 6.

For rapid donning, pull excess cord downward and open up the boots, keeping them laced. Then, simply step into the boots and pull the cross-laces starting at the bottom. For faster removal of boots from injured soldiers, the IDF cuts the laces instead of the boots.



(Contributed by Mike Sparks, U. S. Army National Guard, Fayetteville, North Carolina.)

BOOK REVIEWS



Battle for Korea: The Associated Press History of the Korean Conflict. By Robert J. Dvorchak and the Writers and Photographers of the Associated Press. Combined Books, Inc., 1993. 319 Pages. \$34.95.

Seldom have U.S. soldiers faced a more aggressive and implacable foe than the armies that poured into South Korea in the early hours of 25 June 1950, and it is encouraging to see that the Korean War is being examined anew for the lessons it has to offer. These lessons are not limited to the tactical lessons learned at terrible cost, but also include operations that require commanders to deal with masses of refugees, with unrest in prisoner of war compounds, with the evacuation of noncombatants from facilities destined for demolition.

Today, our attention is drawn to the military realities of operations other than war, and as we plan for peace operations, humanitarian assistance, civil disturbances, and a number of other contingencies, we need only look to a history of events on the Korean peninsula to see how other leaders faced similar challenges, and why they succeeded or failed. The lessons of Task Force Smith are reflected in the doctrine that guides today's leaders and trainers, but this book touches upon other issues of relevance to the Army that will defend our nation in the next century, and that makes it well worth reading.

Robert Dvorchak's superb main narrative draws upon the experience of the individual soldiers and Marines who fought in the Korean War, and includes many first-hand accounts of the wartime reporters who covered the conflict. The issue of prisoners of war—both captured enemy and UN forces seized by the North Koreans and the Chinese—receives considerable attention, addressing the conduct of Americans held by the North Koreans. The author includes a copy of the code of conduct for U.S. soldiers, which owes much of its substance to the experience of U.S. POWs.

The book contains a great many photographs, some familiar and some never before published. A number of them are not for the squeamish; they portray the atrocities committed by Communist forces against

civilian noncombatants and captured U.S. soldiers. But these, too, have their purpose, showing the nature of an enemy that we have already faced once in this century and may well have to face again.

Battle for Korea affords an excellent overview of the Korean War's chronology and subsequent events and is a bargain—for the insights it offers on the key personalities, for its lucid analysis of the decisions that led us into war, and for the accounts of incredible bravery and sacrifice of men and women who had to face and defeat a fanatical enemy in some of the worst fighting conditions in the history of our armed forces. Buy it, read it, and share it with your friends; this is a story that needs to be told.

Reconciliation Road: A Family Odyssey of War and Honor. By John D. Marshall. Syracuse University Press, 1993. 310 Pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, United States Army, Retired.

S.L.A. (SLAM) Marshall (1900-1977)—grandfather of this book's author—was, in his time, a journalist, a U.S. Army officer (eventually reaching the rank of brigadier general in the Army Reserve), and a prolific writer in the area of military affairs. He was not, and never claimed to be, a military historian. Forrest Pogue, a trained historian who served under Marshall in Europe during World War II and was later a member of the Army's Office of the Chief of Military History, said of him:

[Marshall] did not have a historian's training and, I fear, had a certain contempt for pedants who let exact facts stand in the way of a good story. At times, when he was writing an article or pushing some point of doctrine, he was capable of pulling a figure out of the air and suggesting that this was based on the solid information gathered by the 200 combat historians under his command. Some of us were in total disagreement.

Still, SLAM's development of the combat interview technique at Makin and Kwajalein and his many post-World War II writings—particularly *Men Against Fire* and *The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a*

Nation—made him well-known throughout the Army, at least at the highest levels. In fact, the Army's leaders were so impressed that they elevated him to the status of military genius. For some 20 years—from the late 1940s to the late 1960s—everything he wrote or said was accepted as gospel. (I doubt that even Clausewitz, come back to life, would have been awarded higher honors.) Even today, SLAM's writings are on the recommended reading lists throughout the Army's school system.

SLAM learned one important thing during his World War II service—how to make it pay off when he returned to civilian life in 1946. With few exceptions, everything he wrote during and after the war was commercially printed and brought him monetary profits. For these publications, he used not only his own field notes (which can no longer be located) but also the official after-action reports of the units involved and the field notes submitted by other historians, records that were probably not available to other writers. He even took his well-received *Armed Forces Officer*—written under contract for the Army—massaged it a bit, and republished it commercially under the title *The Officer As a Leader*.

In a sense, then, SLAM had the best of both worlds: He was permitted access to official records, many probably classified at the time he saw them, and with a passing nod to the Army—a brief report, an incomplete study—used the information as a basis for his war stories *The River and the Gauntlet*, *Battle at Best*, *Pork Chop Hill*, *Ambush*, and all the rest. And the Army's leaders blessed each and every one.

SLAM did have his critics in the Army, particularly in the ranks of combat infantrymen, of which I am one. We could not understand how a newspaperman—someone who had never led men in battle (despite his claim to have done so during World War I) and who had never spent a day with a rifle platoon or company in battle—could be so revered by our senior commanders. To us, most of *Men Against Fire* was a joke, or perhaps a fraud perpetrated by a master storyteller, a voyeur-warrior who had ingratiated himself with the "right" people. We did not

BOOK REVIEWS

feel he could in any way compare to the likes of Ernie Pyle.

Today, there are more critics, who have raised serious doubts about Marshall the man and Marshall the military writer. They point out that he lied about his World War I military service; lied about the number of combat interviews he conducted during World War II; had no basis in fact for stating that no more than 25 percent of the Army's infantrymen ever fired their weapons in combat; masqueraded as a general officer from 1952 to 1957; and was often photographed wearing the Combat Infantryman Badge (I have my doubts about the bronze arrowhead he is pictured wearing on his Pacific ribbon, along with three campaign stars). And finally, the critics say, his concept and purpose of combat interviews could not approach that developed by Hugh Cole, an outstanding military historian who served with the Third Army during World War II and who spelled out his concept in a strongly worded reply to Marshall in a memorandum dated 9 December 1944. (That memorandum is found in Appendix B of Major Williams's TRADOC historical monograph mentioned in this book.)

To counter the growing criticism, John D. Marshall, a former Army officer himself, set out from his homebase in Seattle on a cross-country tour to talk with the people who knew and admired his grandfather and to confront certain of SLAM's critics. And yet, it seems to me that John's personal "odyssey" was far more important to him than his grandfather's legacy. After graduating from the Army's senior ROTC program at the University of Virginia in 1969, and after receiving his commission and attending a basic officer course at Fort Benning, John became a conscientious objector (CO) and left the Army. This action, during the Vietnam War, caused SLAM to write him a blistering letter of condemnation, and the two never again spoke with or saw each other.

The sting of that letter went deep and apparently still festers in John's inner being; he cannot forget it. He believes he was right in what he did, and what he needs from this trip is the support of other, certain kinds of people. During his interviews, therefore, he often raises the subject, trying to draw out the interviewees' thoughts on his CO status.

Some give him great solace. Along the way, however, he falls into a pattern: Those who consider SLAM a great historian are pictured in a flattering manner: John Westover is a "real salt-of-the-Midwest"; Lucian K. Truscott, III, "a tough-talking, hard-charger"; Frank Vandiver, "a man of great

exuberance"; Sidney Berry, "an unmistakable presence for a general"; and so on. But his critics are handled differently: David Hackworth is "a person marked by his limited education and intellect"; Bud Leinbaugh (now dead), "slim of build, with a hound dog face and a countenance so dour it appears he has been sucking on a lemon"; and me, I am "professionally jealous" of SLAM, whatever that means (since John never used this term during our talk at Fort Benning, I do not know).

At the end of his almost three-month "odyssey," John Marshall concludes that his grandfather was not a fraud, saying that his work still "stands, not perfect, but solid, important, even historic." I prefer Roy Appleman's description: "SLAM's work is of uneven proportions and must be used with discretion."

As for his personal "odyssey," John Marshall believes, to paraphrase John F. Kennedy's words, that the conscientious objector will eventually enjoy the same reputation and prestige the warrior does. That day has certainly come for those COs who served willingly and well in non-combatant positions. It may never come for those who chose to turn their backs to their country.

How Great Generals Win. By Bevin Alexander. W.W. Norton and Company, 1993. 320 Pages. \$25.00. Reviewed by Dr. Charles E. White, Infantry School Historian.

How Great Generals Win is an interesting book that probes the secrets of great generals, 13 dynamic leaders from ancient times to the present: Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, William Tecumseh Sherman, Lawrence of Arabia, Allenby, Mao Tse-tung (Zedong), Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein, Erwin Rommel, and Douglas MacArthur.

Author Bevin Alexander admits that his choice of the "great" generals was conditioned by his experiences in Korea:

The lesson I learned from Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge was that great generals do not act as did the generals who ordered the ridgeline battles in Korea. Great generals do not repeat what has failed before. They do not send troops directly into battle for which the enemy is prepared and waiting. On the contrary, great generals strike where they are least expected against opposition that is weak and disorganized.

From this experience and his later study of military history, Alexander developed a penchant for generals who practiced maneuver warfare and Liddell Hart's concept of the

"indirect approach." As a result, this book focuses on what Alexander considers the essence of "great" generalship.

He says that "great" generals are those who seek to envelop their opponents through the "indirect approach." Generals who use frontal, attritional assaults (including Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant) are roundly condemned. But this definition of greatness is so narrow that it leaves the author open to criticism. For example, it is a gross misinterpretation of history to say, as he does, that Lee could "easily have swung past" Meade's army at Gettysburg (and on to Harrisburg and Philadelphia), while Grant's campaign in Virginia in 1864 nearly cost the Union the war. The facts simply do not support such conclusions.

Any reasonable study of the U.S. Civil War will show that both Lee and Grant were great generals who practiced maneuver warfare. Both tried to outmaneuver their opponents whenever possible. Unfortunately, there were times when their opponents were very capable adversaries who took steps to prevent being enveloped. Does this mean that Lee and Grant are not to be considered "great"? Sadly, Alexander misses this subtle point.

A closer look at the 13 "great" generals will reveal some striking inconsistencies. First, all of the generals had secure bases from which to operate while their opponents did not. Second, Alexander's generals had organizations that were generally more flexible than their enemies' structures. Third, all 13 had intelligence apparatuses that were superior to those of their opponents. Last, they all sought to envelop their opponents by means of the "indirect approach." In other words, all of Alexander's great generals had a distinct advantage over their opponents at the particular times and places the author chose to illustrate his point. And this is why Lee and Grant are not considered "great."

Why, then, is Napoleon on the list? When discussing the generalship of Napoleon, Alexander conveniently ignores the attritional battles Napoleon fought against Russia in 1812 and the Allied coalition in 1813. Moreover, he fails to discuss that great frontal assault Napoleon attempted at Waterloo in 1815. Instead, he concentrates on those aspects of Napoleonic warfare that fit his model of maneuver warfare and the "indirect approach." Why did Alexander not do the same for Lee and Grant?

What about all the other generals in history who do not fit the author's paradigm? What about Alexander "the Great," or Frederick "the Great"? Any reader of this book

needs to understand the author's intent and realize that he has ransacked history to produce a list of "great" generals who practiced what *he* preaches. The reader must therefore ask probing questions when confronting such arguments as those put forth in this book.

Nevertheless, *How Great Generals Win* is an interesting and informative book, and the author brings out many good points to prove his theory of "greatness." Just keep his agenda in mind.

Rangers At War: Combat Recon in Vietnam. By Shelby L. Stanton. Orion Books, 1992. 382 Pages. \$25.00. Reviewed by Leroy Thompson, Manchester, Missouri.

As with Shelby Stanton's other works on the Vietnam War, this one combines excellent scholarship with the feel for the war of one who served. The organization of this work is especially appealing, as it offers first an overall view of the development of the Rangers as well as the evolution of combat reconnaissance in Vietnam. Once this background has been established, much of the rest of the book is organized by unit, primarily divisions but also independent brigades and field force reconnaissance elements. This organization allows the researcher or veteran who is interested primarily in one unit to find the relevant information easily. A separate chapter deals with Ranger advisors who served in Vietnam, and a concluding chapter examines the Ranger course during the conflict, the MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) Recondo School, and the lessons learned from combat reconnaissance in Vietnam. Finally, a well-organized group of appendixes allows rapid analysis of Ranger unit organization, logistical requirements, losses, and the like. Rounding out the book are some of the best maps available in any work on the conflict. The index is also a comprehensive reference aid.

Rangers At War has information to offer to those who are interested in Special Operations history, as well as those interested in the Vietnam War. Since so few Vietnam Ranger or long range reconnaissance patrol veterans remain on active duty to pass on their experience by word of mouth, light infantry, Ranger, or airborne personnel should find this a worthwhile addition to their store of professional knowledge.

In addition to reviewing the book, I have already had occasion to refer to it numerous

times to answer factual questions about unit designations, areas of operation, and tables of organization and equipment. I recommend the book highly. My only problem with it, in fact, is deciding whether to put it on my Vietnam shelf or my Special Operations shelf so I can find it easily the next time I need it.

The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff. By Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall. Brassey's (UK), 1992. 508 Pages. \$39.95. Reviewed by Major Harold E. Raugh, Jr., United States Army.

Although it is the infantryman behind the bayonet who closes with and destroys the enemy, the tactical success can be lost by those who are responsible for the direction of the war at higher levels. The evolution, policies, personalities, and effectiveness of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff—those responsible for the higher conduct of war—is the subject of the superb study *The Chiefs*.

After introducing the general topic and placing it in its historical context, the authors begin with the formation of the Committee of Imperial Defense in 1904 in the wake of the British Army's near-disastrous performance, in the South African (Second Boer) War. The evolution of the UK Chiefs of Staff—collectively and individually, in success and failure—is recounted and assessed in rich detail.

Through world wars, colonial campaigns, and perhaps an even greater enemy—fiscal retrenchment—the Chiefs became a much more effective instrument for waging war. (Indeed, their institutionalization in the early 1920s set the pattern for strategic coordination and policy cooperation that the United States later emulated with great effect.) The next-to-last chapter, focusing on the tremendous victory in the Falklands campaign, clearly illustrates the unparalleled effectiveness of the Chiefs of Staff system.

This superb study is well written and frequently witty as well. Each of the 13 chapters includes a detailed chronology and a list of key personages, and more than 50 excellent photographs enlivens the text. The use of primary and secondary sources is generally good, with the significant exception of the authors' heavy reliance, in the two World War II chapters, on Winston Churchill's self-serving and fact-distorting "personal history" of the conflict. Three appendixes, references, bibliography, and index conclude the book.

The authors, listed on the dust jacket as simply Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, are in fact, General Sir William Jackson, who served as an Assistant Chief of the General Staff (1968-1970) and in other senior command and staff positions, and a noted military historian in his own right; and Field Marshal Lord Bramall, who served as Vice Chief of the Defense Staff (1978-1979), Chief of the General Staff during the 1982 Falklands War, and Chief of the Defense Staff (equivalent to the U.S. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) from 1982 to 1985. By virtue of their professional and personal experience and their previous contributions to military history, no better authors could have been found to write this study.

The 20th century has been a tumultuous era of unprecedented world wars and regional conflicts, many involving the armed forces of the United Kingdom. Their many successes reflect the increasingly effective direction of the war by the Chiefs of Staff. This insightful study is highly recommended to all who are interested in British military history and the often fragile relationship between military leaders and their civilian superiors.

No Shining Armor: The Marines at War in Vietnam: An Oral History. By Otto J. Lehrack. University Press of Kansas, 1992. 398 Pages. Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

Add this excellent book to the best of the several outstanding oral histories on various aspects of the Vietnam War. Author Otto Lehrack spent five years collecting more than 3,000 pages of interviews with members of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, the unit in which he served during the war.

During its four years in country—from its initial mission of security at Chu Lai in May 1965, through service around Danang, on and into the DMZ, at Khe Sanh, on the Rockpile, through standdown on 1 October 1969—the battalion fought in every section of 1 Corps. The battalion's experiences are representative of Marines and other combat soldiers during the height of the war.

To provide a framework, the author injects brief narratives drawn from the battalion's command chronologies and the work of other scholars to augment the story, essentially told by the participants at the ground level. This model of combat oral history belongs alongside Eric Hammel's equally fascinating narratives *Ambush Valley, Fire in*

BOOK REVIEWS

the Streets, and Khe Sanh: Siege in the Clouds, as the Marine combat histories of the war.

Sykes' Regular Infantry Division, 1861-1864: A History of Regular United States Infantry Operations in the Civil War's Eastern Theater. By Timothy J. Reese. McFarland & Company, 1990. 466 Pages. \$45.00. Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, United States Air Force, Retired.

When you read about the history of the Civil War, most of the units you'll see mentioned were volunteer forces raised by individual states in the north. But look closer, and you'll also see several noteworthy units with such designations as 2nd U.S. Artillery, 2nd U.S. Infantry, and so on. These are the Regular Army units that were in active Federal service before the war began.

During the years just before 1861, the Regular Army was spread primarily throughout the vast spaces of the American west trying to keep the peace. When the conflict began, most of these units were brought east, although some were taken captive by Confederate forces in Texas and kept prisoner for quite some time.

The Regular Infantry Division, primarily under the command of Colonel George Sykes (hence the title of this book) saw major action from the battle of Bull Run through the beginning of Grant's 1864 campaign. After the Union rout at the first battle of Bull Run, the Regular Army units provided both the nucleus that ensured the protection of Washington and also the continued development and organization of the Union Army in its early months. It also played a significant part in the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and the Wilderness. The Regulars were also used to control the New York draft riots of 1863. Unfortunately, by the time Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox, the Regular Army units had suffered such major losses that none of them were left to be represented there.

Reese has done an outstanding job in writing this divisional history of the Regular Army units that saw action during the Civil War. He concludes the book with several tables that provide the order of battle for Regular units at each of the major battles in which they fought. The well-documented book relies upon numerous personal accounts in addition to the standard official sources and other unit histories.

Overall, this new history completes the picture of the roles both the volunteer troops and the Regular forces of the United States played in bringing the war to a successful conclusion for the North.

To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. By Stephen W. Sears. Ticknor & Fields, 1992. 468 Pages. \$24.95. Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, United States Army.

The Peninsula Campaign of 1862 was the largest campaign of the U.S. Civil War. Conceived in early spring as a joint operation to bring General George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac to the gates of Richmond, it actually encompassed several major battles, including Yorktown and Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, and the Seven Days Battle. More than one-quarter million troops were assembled on the Virginia peninsula for this battle for the capital of the Confederacy.

This book, written by noted Civil War historian Stephen Sears, is the most comprehensive account of the campaign, combining campaign analysis, unit history, and first person accounts of the fighting and leaders who struggled on the peninsula. When the first shot was fired on Malvern Hill on 1 July, McClellan's grand scheme to end the war lay in shambles, a victim of Southern aggressiveness, coupled with his own mediocre generalship and tactical incompetence.

What makes this history so applicable to today's leaders is the analysis of why Robert E. Lee won in the campaign even though his casualties far exceeded those of his opponent, and his own staff and battle coordination were substandard. The Lee who emerges from these pages is a confident commander who seizes the initiative throughout the campaign and strives to synchronize his subordinate elements in a classic battle of annihilation. According to Sears, Lee was perfectly confident that his strategy would produce a decisive result.

Equally important for contemporary officers are the lessons to be learned from the Peninsula Campaign. While McClellan seemed incapable of constructive self-analysis, Lee reorganized his army, appointed battle-proven lieutenants to higher commands, ruthlessly dismissed officers who failed to demonstrate combat leadership, and established a stronger commissary system. The net result was the emergence of one of the most famous armies in American history, the Army of Northern Virginia. Within a month of assuming command, Lee took this army

north to Manassas and Sharpsburg, far from the gates of Richmond.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

The End of a Military Century? By Albert Legault. International Development Research Centre, Canada, 1993. 116 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.

Korea: The First War We Lost. Revised edition. By Bevin Alexander. Published in hard cover in 1986. Hippocrene Books, 1993. 580 Pages. \$16.95, Softbound.

Jungle in Black. By Steve Maguire. Bantam Falcon, 1992. 288 Pages.

God's Dodger. By G.W. Stephen Brodsky. Elysium Publishing Company (8598 Moxon Terrace, Sidney, B.C., V8L 1K6, Canada), 1993. \$16.00, Softbound.

After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East. By Anthony H. Cordesman. Westview Press, 1993. 811 Pages. \$65.00.

Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception. By William B. Breuer. Praeger, 1993. 272 Pages. \$24.95.

The World Factbook: 1993-94. By the Central Intelligence Agency. Brassey's (US), 1993. 430 Pages. \$30.00.

Crusade: Undercover Against the Mafia & KGB. By Tom Tripodi with Joseph P. DeSario. Brassey's (US), 1993. 288 Pages. \$23.00.

Colleges and Universities in World War II. By V.R. Cardozier. Praeger, 1993. 264 Pages. \$49.95.

Assignment: Pentagon: The Insider's Guide to the Potomac Puzzle Palace. Second Edition, Revised. By Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF, Retired. Brassey's (US), 1993. 298 Pages. \$16.00, Softbound.

"Mad Jack": The Biography of Captain John Percival, USN, 1779-1862. By David F. Long. Contributions to Military Studies, No. 136. Greenwood Press, 1993. 288 Pages. \$55.00.

Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War. By William L. Smallwood. Brassey's (US), 1993. 288 Pages. \$22.00.

Courage in the Skies: Great Air Battles from the Somme to DESERT STORM. By J.E. Johnson and P.B. Lucas. Trafalgar Square (North Pomfret, VT 05053), 1993. 208 Pages. \$39.95.

In Many A Stripe: General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S. Marine Corps, 1917-1956. By Allan R. Millett. Naval Institute Press, 1993. 456 Pages. \$39.95.

Crossed Currents: Navy Women from WWI to Tailhook. By Jean Ebbert and Marie-Beth Hall. Brassey's (US), 1993. 356 Pages. \$24.00.

Not for Sale at Any Price: How We Can Save America for our Children. By Ross Perot. Hyperion, 1993. 155 Pages. \$5.95, Softbound.

How to Locate Anyone Who Is or Has Been in the Military: Armed Forces Locator Directory. By Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Johnson. Military Information Enterprises (P.O. Box 5143, Burlington, VT 27216), 1993. 264 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

Verification: The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s. By John G. Tower, James Brown, and William K. Cheek. Brassey's (US), 1992. \$32.00.

Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War I. By Donald Richter. University Press of Kansas, 1992. 320 Pages. \$35.00.

From The Editor

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Professional development means many things to many people, but it boils down to the sharing of knowledge. In the process of becoming well-versed in our profession, we tend to underestimate the value of our own experience, preferring instead to rely upon the more formalized writings of others. Don't sell yourself short; regardless of the point at which you now find yourself in your career, you have probably gained experience and insights that less experienced soldiers will find useful as they set out on their own careers.

In this issue of INFANTRY you will find articles ranging from the Anzio Beachhead of World War II to the exciting 21st Century Land Warrior concept. In between are articles on combat service support (CSS) operations in Somalia, tips on getting promoted, and the need for doctrinal literature to support our Army's expanded role in operations other than war (OOTW).

The Anzio article is not intended to be simply a commemorative piece on a battle fought 50 years ago; it was selected for the relevant lessons it offers on small unit leadership, the employment of armor, artillery and air power, and the tenacity of those who were our predecessors in the profession of arms. The article on CSS operations in Somalia highlights the challenge of supporting a battalion task force in OOTW.

This range of experience in such diverse yet related fields as logistics and close combat mirrors the concerns of today's Army as much as it did in the past. The idea that amateurs talk tactics while professionals talk logistics—possibly apocryphal—has been attributed to commanders from Napoleon to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, but the need for fighters who understand logistics, and for logisticians who appreciate the needs of the units they support, has been obvious throughout history.

At INFANTRY we are committed to presenting the type of material that will support the total professional development needs of the force, and you can be a part of that effort. You have probably never written for publication before, but every writer has to start sometime. None of our many published authors was born a writer, but at some point each of them decided that he had something worth sharing with his peers, and he did something about it.

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RAE

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